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ABSTRACT
Haina Ding, B.A., M.A., Institute of Business Administration, Toulouse University 1 Capi-
tole. June, 2014. Major Professor: Alexander Guembel
This dissertation contains three independent essays. The rst two essays look at the in-
formational role of stock prices and its impact on the real economy. The last one explores the
relationship between managerial incentive and product market competition.
In the rst essay, two rms compete in a product market and have an opportunity to in-
vest in a risky technology either early on as a leader or later once stock prices reveal the value of
the technology. Information leakage thus introduces an option of waiting, which enhances produc-
tion e¢ ciency. A potential leader may nevertheless be discouraged from investing upfront, when
anticipating its competitor to invest later in response to good news. I show that an increase in
product market competition increases the option value of waiting but has an ambiguous e¤ect on
information production. It may thus be the case that intense competition leads to more leakage
such that no rm would invest, especially so in a smaller market. Given a moderate level of compe-
tition, price informativeness may improve investment outcome when investment protability and
the market size are relatively large.
The second essay examines the feedback e¤ects of certications in nancial markets. A rm
has to decide whether to monitor (or to ascertain) internally the prospect of a potential investment
or to delegate this task to a certier who reveals his evaluations to the outsiders. The investment
decision is then taken based on all of the information available in the market. The information
asymmetry between the rm and lenders is alleviated under delegation, and hence the rm enjoys a
lower cost of capital at the nancing stage. Delegation however reduces the information advantage of
speculators who then make less e¤ort to acquire information. This results in a potential information
crowding-out e¤ect. We show that the rm may prefer to delegate when the prior belief about the
investment prospect is relatively high, and to choose in-house information production when its own
signal is more precise and when its current assets in place generate a higher expected payo¤.
The third essay considers a spatial competition model with horizontal and vertical di¤eren-
tiation. Two rms are assigned to exogenous locations on a circular city. Consumers, distributed
on the circle, need to pay a transportation cost for purchasing. Anticipating a future uncertainty
in product quality, rms simultaneously o¤er incentive contracts to managers to induce an optimal
e¤ort level. I show that competition may adversely a¤ects incentives, as a lower transportation cost
impairs a rms local market power and consequently reduces a rms marginal benet from produc-
ing a high quality product, particularly when its competitor also produces a high quality product.
On the other hand, greater competition reduces a rms prot if it fails to improve product quality.
This e¤ect increases the optimal e¤ort level and becomes dominant if the quality improvement is
relatively large compared to the e¤ort cost. Moreover, a large decrease in the transportation cost
may change the market structure, such that the rm with better quality goods attracts all the
demand, and thus the positive e¤ect of competition on managerial e¤ort becomes more signicant.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
Proposed independently by Eugene F. Fama and Paul A. Samuelson in the 1960s,
the e¢ cient market hypothesis (EMH) has been one of the main cornerstones in the nance
theory. The general concept of the EMH is that nancial markets are e¢ cient in the sense
that asset prices reect all the relevant information about an asset. Researchers and prac-
titioners have since applied extensively this idea to theoretical models and empirical tests
of securities prices in nancial markets. A growing literature in the extension of the EMH
suggests that stock market can provide a useful source of information.1 When one agrees, or
at least partially, with the EMH, he may believe that stock prices are e¢ cient in reecting
the consequence of corporate decisions in the expected future cash ows of a rm, which
make stock prices rather like a side show2. The newly developed theory argues that stock
prices can take a more active role in aggregating diverse pieces of information from the
big pool of informed outsiders who hope to prot from trading on their information in the
stock market. Information transmitted through share prices may then be incorporated into
corporate decisions, such that stock market e¢ ciency has a real impact on the economy.
The active informational role of stock prices has been explored by Dow and Gorton
(1997), and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) among others,3 and it is also well supported
by recent empirical evidence. Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang (2012) show the stock prices can
discipline managers by triggering takeover activities. Fresard (2012) nds that a rms cash
1The origin of this idea can be traced back to Hayek (1945).
2See, for example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990).
3See Bond, Edmans and Goldstein (2012) for a detailed review on this subject.
1
saving is sensitive to stock price typically when the price contains more new information
previously unpossessed by managers. Zuo (2013) studies whether managers use the infor-
mation contained in stock prices when forecasting future earnings, and the author conrms
the hypothesis. More studies focus on the impact of stock price e¢ ciency on decisions in
investment and production, and nd that the level of price informativeness a¤ects positively
the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price.4 It is only natural for one to think
that managers may use the information produced by outside investors into investment deci-
sions, since those are possibly most complex tasks for managers in terms of understanding
the investment prospect with various future uncertainties. Those uncertainties may include
the changes in market regulations, in demands and supplies from upstream and downstream
clients, as well as the changes in market structure and the industrial evolution, among which
the production market interaction should obviously play an important role.
For example, Foucault and Frésard (2012) nd a positive relationship between a rms
investment and the market valuation of its peers selling related products. The signicance
of this link increases with the stock price informativeness of the peers and the demand
correlation between products. Ozoguz and Rebello (2013) document similar results and
further show that the investment sensitivity to peersshare prices is stronger in an industry
with faster growth, higher competition and greater dependence on capital. Relating to the
empirical ndings, we may wonder about the potential underlying mechanisms for one rms
investment decisions being a¤ected by stock price movements of its peers or competitors.
The rst essay (Chapter 2) in my thesis directly concerns this research question.
4See for example Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007), Bakke and Whited (2010), Foucault and Fresard
(2012, 2013) among others.
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Chapter 2 studies theoretically how information leakage due to stock price movements
a¤ects rms innovation incentives. I consider information leakage of a public rm that
invests in an innovation. The actual result or realization of this innovation is the proprietary
knowledge to this rm. However, speculators in the stock market may exert e¤ort and use
their expertise to acquire this information. Once speculators participate in trading, the value
of this innovation investment can be transmitted by share prices and observed by other rms.
Share prices thus become the channel of information leakage, revealing one rms private
knowledge to the others. In an industry where rms watch closely their rivalsactions while
striving to protect their own secrets, it is rather plausible that such a leakage about one
rms prospect will benet its competitors in their decisions to make similar investments.
Consequently, good news about one rms innovation makes its rival more optimistic about
their own opportunities and thus more incentivized to invest.
More specically, I consider two rms competing in a duopoly industry. Firms are
identical to each other except that they produce substitute goods. The degree of product
substitution then determines the level of competition in the product market. Firms need
to decide simultaneously whether to invest upfront in a technology that may reduce the
production cost. I assume that this technology is the same to both rms, and thus success
or failure of the investment is perfectly correlated across rms. Both rms are publicly listed.
If one rm chooses to invest in the technology early on as a leader, it learns privately the
value of technology at the intermediate stage. This information can then be acquired by
speculators at a cost and partially revealed by share prices after trading takes place in the
stock market. Firms therefore have an option of waiting for additional information before
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making investment decisions. If the technology succeeds, waiting would however impose the
cost disadvantage to the follower until it also invests in the technology.
I show that information leakage can have both positive and negative impact on re-
source allocation. On the one hand, when expecting information leakage about an innovation
investment taken by one rm in the industry, other rms can wait and delay their own in-
vestment decisions until learning about the value of this innovation. This would reduce
investment in something eventually proved to be useless. Information leakage also reduces
the uncertainty of the investment outcome to potential followers and may thus encourage
their investment, which would not take place otherwise. On the other hand, information
leakage will induce more incentives for rms to free ride on the leader rm who invests up-
front, such that the potential leader may be deterred from investing due to rent dissipation.
As a consequence, no rm would invest in equilibrium and it becomes impossible to learn
the actual value of the technology. In this case, leakage reduces the e¢ ciency in resource
allocation.
I also show that the aforementioned e¤ects can be either alleviated or amplied de-
pending on the industry characteristics. More particularly, I show that when there is intense
competition in a relatively small product market (i.e., with relatively low demand), the leak-
age through stock prices would exacerbate the negative e¤ect and lead to a lower production
e¢ ciency, i.e., it becomes more likely to reach the equilibrium with no rm investing in the
technology. This is because the amount of information leakage is endogenized and dependent
on the characteristics of the innovation and the industry, since those characteristics such as
market competition or the market size of the industry determine the variance of rmsnal
4
payo¤s and hence the incentive of speculators to acquire information. As a consequence,
the fundamentals in the economy have a direct impact on the value of the option of wait-
ing, and they also a¤ect the option value indirectly by changing the amount of information
production in the stock market. Two e¤ects may work to mitigate each other or to amplify
the result. While the model employs the logic of real options, the information leakage is
endogezied as information becomes available through share prices. It thus di¤erentiates the
model from the standard industry organization literature, which usually assumes that either
leakage (or information spillover) occurs when rms take certain actions or leakage arrives
with an exogenous probability.5
I nd that an increase in the level of product market competition increases the option
value of waiting, but it has an ambiguous e¤ect on the information production in the stock
market. It may thus be the case that more competition increases the variance of rms
future payo¤s such that it would potentially lead to more information leakage available
to the follower. This e¤ect further increases the option value, and amplies the free-rider
problem. The rent dissipation becomes more severe in a smaller product market such that
the potential leader is deterred, no rm would invest in equilibrium, and the production
e¢ ciency is lowered.
By endogenizing many parameters that characterize the innovation and the industry,
as well as the process of information transmission in the stock market, the model is able to
provide cross-sectional implications. We shall expect that the follower rms investment is
more sensitive to its competitors share price movements, given a relatively higher competi-
5See for example Thijssen and Huisman (2001).
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tion level, a larger market size and a higher protability of the innovation investment, which
is largely consistent with empirical ndings, such as in Ozoguz and Rebello (2013). This
relationship is however not monotonic due to the endogeneity of information leakage. We
should thus observe that in a relatively small market, intense competition leads to weaker
investment sensitivity to share prices. In this case, the correlation between rmsspecic
returns as well as the total amount of R&D investment should also be lower. The model
thus provides new empirical implications that wait to be tested in the future.
Chapter 3 is a co-authored paper with Alexander Guembel. This chapter is related
to the previous one in the sense that it is based on the same theoretical background about
the impact of information e¢ ciency in the stock market on the real economy, but Chapter 3
takes a di¤erent perspective. In Chapter 2, information acquisition of speculators is a¤ected
purely by rmsinvestment decisions. Firms do not, and they cannot, credibly reveal their
private information concerning the investment, and thus there are no direct interactions
between speculatorsactivities with other informed agents. In Chapter 3, however, we take
into account such an interaction and model the consequent feedback e¤ect on rmsdecisions.
More specically, we consider the application of the informational role of certication
intermediaries in a market with asymmetric information between buyers and sellers whereas
either side cannot credibly disseminate their private information. These intermediaries are
designed to acquire the signals about the privately informed parties and then to reveal
to uninformed parties. Their credibility can be endorsed by laws and regulations, and/or
determined by various mechanisms in di¤erent markets. Examples of certication intermedi-
aries include auditors, industrial certication systems, credit rating agencies, and investment
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banks that evaluate the quality of rms that want to raise capital. The literature related to
certication intermediaries focuses either on their strategies of information disclosure due to
conicts of interests between the users of the information and the intermediaries6, or on the
functionality of certiers as a device for inspection or signalling7.
The chapter may thus concern the certiers in nancial market, such as a credit
rating agency who is perceived to take the role of providing an independent opinion on
the credit quality of rms. Moreover, if ratings contain information, they may alter the
expectation of market participants about the overall quality of a rm, and thus inuence
a rms nancing cost and subsequent investment decisions8. This then raises the question
how a certier, such as rating agencies, a¤ects the information production by speculators in
the nancial markets, whose payo¤s are directly related to rmsinvestment decisions. Being
outsiders of a rm, speculators can actively acquire information on rm value and prot from
trading. When the private information possessed by speculators is revealed via share prices,
it may then improve the decision taken by the rm. As a result, by changing the rms
cost of capital and subsequent investment actions, the announcement made by certication
intermediaries inuences speculatorsincentive of information acquisition and ultimately the
total amount of information available for guiding resource allocation. Despite its importance
to market e¢ ciency, the interaction between information production by certication agencies
and private speculators has not been analyzed.
In the model, a rm has to decide whether to monitor (or to ascertain) internally
6See for example Viscusi (1978) Lizzeri (1999), Peyrache and Quesada (2004).
7See for example Fasten and Hofmann (2010), Stahl and Strausz (2011).
8See Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006), Manso (2013).
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the prospect of a potential investment or to delegate this task to a certier who reveals his
evaluations to the outsiders. In our model, the di¤erence between delegating and in-house
(internal) information production only lies in whether this piece of information is publicized
by the certier or remains private to the rm itself. The rm needs to decide, after updating
its belief by using all available information in the market, whether to make the investment.
Under delegation, lenders have access to the certiers evaluation, and hence the information
asymmetry between the rm and lenders is alleviated. On the other hand, while delegation
increases the transparency of a rms prospects, it may reduce the expected trading gain
to the speculators, who now have less information advantage. As a result, speculators may
make less e¤ort to acquire information, which leads to a potential information crowding-out.
The rm thus faces the following trade-o¤. Delegation avoids the adverse selection problem
at the nancing stage, but possibly reduces information available from stock prices, and
conversely for the in-house information production.
We show that, for some parameter regions, if the rm chooses in-house information
production there is a separating equilibrium at the nancing stage such that the borrowing
cost is higher than under delegation, in which case the low-type borrower can be observed in-
stead of screened by a higher interest rate. When a priori it is more likely for the investment
to realize a high payo¤ in the future, it is preferable for a rm to choose delegation except
when the prior belief about the investment is very high. The causes are twofold. Firstly, a
higher prior makes the low type borrower more inclined to mimic under the regime of in-house
production, while it reduces the lending interest rate under the regime of delegation. Two
e¤ects combined enlarge the di¤erence in the nancing cost between two regimes. Moreover,
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with in-house information production, a higher prior reduces the variance of payo¤ realiza-
tions of the investment and hence speculators incentive of information acquisition, which
is again in the opposite direction compared to the regime of delegation. The crowding-out
e¤ect thus becomes less severe, and the rm more likely chooses to delegate.
Furthermore, if the signal obtained and kept private by the rm predicts better the
state of the world, the rent from mimicking falls as well as the interest demanded by the
lenders. This increases the payo¤variance and thus the information acquired by speculators.
As a comparison, when the information prevailing in the market is more precise under del-
egation, speculators nd it less protable to acquire additional information, which reduces
information available through stock price. As a consequence, when the rm expects to get a
private signal with a higher precision, the advantage of delegation in having a lower nancing
cost is reduced while information crowding-out becomes more severe and dominant. The rm
thus more likely chooses not to reveal its private signal through delegation. Under a similar
reasoning, we show in addition that the rm prefers not to delegate when the expected payo¤
of the rms current assets-in-place is higher.
The last chapter looks at a somewhat di¤erent topic - the relationship between product
market competition and incentives. It has long been a popular research topic, not only
because its ambiguity and complexity provide a fruitful area for exploration, but because
the great relevance of the subject to the real world. Shareholders want to know whether
market competition can discipline managers and thus substitute for the incentive scheme.
Regulators need to design policies of shareholder protection or corporate governance within
the environment where the degree of market competition or entry and exit rules should
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be taken into consideration. There has been an on-going debate whether stronger market
competition would increase the incentives of managers, while empirical evidence is limited
but not conclusive.
This paper is another attempt to explore this research area. I consider a spatial
competition model with both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation. Two rms are assigned
to exogenous locations on a circular city. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the circle,
and they need to pay a transportation cost for making a purchase. The rms therefore
enjoy a local market power. The level of competition between two rms is represented
by the transportation cost. At the beginning of the game, both rms anticipate a future
uncertainty in their product qualities. They simultaneously o¤er incentive contracts to the
managers in order to induce an e¤ort level such that the expected rm prot is maximized.
Such a model setup may t better the applications in service sector than in manufacturing
sector, as it links directly the e¤ort choice of managers to the product quality. In addition,
it is usually more di¢ cult to verify the quality of services, which justies the assumption
that rms cannot write a contract directly on the quality of the output. The e¤ect of rms
locations may also give relevant interpretations for the service sector. For example, it is
of interest to understand how the managerial e¤ort in the nancial sector is a¤ected by
the product di¤erentiation, which includes not only the conventional banksgeographical
location choice but also the designs in credit products, for instance.
I show that competition has two opposite e¤ects on equilibrium e¤ort level. A lower
transportation cost impairs a rms local market power, which consequently reduces the
marginal benet that a rm may enjoy from producing a high quality product, particularly
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when expecting its competitors product to be of a high quality. Competition may thus
a¤ect adversely incentives. On the other hand, greater competition reduces a rms prot if
it fails to improve product quality. The e¤ect increases the optimal e¤ort level and becomes
dominant if the magnitude of quality improvement is relatively large compared to the cost
to exert e¤ort. Both e¤ects are less signicant when rms are located further away from
each other and thus more di¤erentiated horizontally. Moreover, I show that a large decrease
in the transportation cost may change the market structure, such that the rm with better
quality goods succeeds to attract all the demand. The positive e¤ect of competition on e¤ort
level becomes more signicant. The results seem to suggest that the relationship between
competition and incentive depends on the absolute level of competition on top of the size
of vertical di¤erentiation and e¤ort cost, which is partially consistent with the ndings of
Beiner, Schmid and Wanzenried (2011).
To summarize, the main contributions of this thesis are the followings. Chapter 2
studies the active role of stock prices in transmitting one rms proprietary information
to its competing rm, and it applies the feedback mechanism to feedback across rms,
which is rather under-investigated in the literature. This chapter also provides a framework
that can be applied to a wide array of corporate decisions in practice, where the payo¤
of one rms action is strategically a¤ected by similar actions taken by its competitors
or industry peers. Examples are, but not limited to, investments in enlarging production
capacities, vertical integrations for the purpose of reducing input price or operating cost,
and outsourcing strategies. Chapter 3 helps to better understand the interaction between
information production by private speculators and other informed outsiders and its impact
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on the information e¢ ciency, which is again an important question that has been paid
little attention in the past. The model also answers the question when rms prefer to
delegate monitoring (information production) to a certier and when they prefer an internal
monitoring. Chapter 3 thus contributes to the literature of certication intermediaries, and
may be used to derive implications on information disclosure policies for both rms and
regulators. Chapter 4 provides a new explanation for the ambiguous relationship between
product market competition and managerial incentive, with an application of the optimal
contracting framework in a multiple agent setting.
12
CHAPTER 2.
INNOVATION STRATEGIES AND STOCK PRICE INFORMATIVENESS
2.1 Introduction
Innovations are regarded as the mainspring of economic dynamics. While providing
rms with advantages in competition, innovations are mostly subject to a large irreversible
investment, uncertainty, and potentially asymmetric information. In this regard, the -
nancial market contributes to technological evolution by facilitating resource allocation, by
nancing and evaluating R&D investments, and by providing channels of risk sharing and
diversication (Levine, 2005). It nevertheless exposes listed rms to the risk of leaking their
proprietary information related to R&D progress, which is one of the main concerns in the
IPO decisions of innovation-intensive rms.1 Information leakage changes the market posi-
tions of leaders and the innovation rent they can seize, which thus a¤ects their incentives to
invest. It consequently inuences competition in an industry and social welfare.
The direct and mostly discussed cause of information leakage are mandatory disclosure
requirements for public rms. Little attention is paid to an indirect leakage via stock price
movements related to R&D investments. Recent literature, however, argues that prices
in nancial markets often take a more active role in providing to managers a source of
information2. Empirical studies also nd strong evidence that rms use the information
contained in their stock prices when making decisions on corporate disclosure, cash savings,
1Brau and Fawcett (2006) report in a survey of CFOs that "Disclosing information to competitors" and
"SEC reporting requirements" are ranked the fourth and fth factors in rmsdecisions to go public.
2The origin of the idea goes back to Hayek (1945), and has been explored in Dow and Gorton (1997), and
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) among others. See Bond, Edmans and Goldstein (2012) for a survey on
the active informational role of prices.
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investment and takeovers3. In an industry where rms watch closely their rivalsactions while
striving to protect their own secrets, it is thus plausible that once stock prices reveal one
rms private information about its innovation progress, this information will be employed
by its competitors in their decisions to make similar investments. Consequently, good news
about one rms innovation makes its rival more optimistic about their own opportunities
and thus more incentivized to invest.4
To address this indirect information leakage, I propose a simple model in which two
rms produce di¤erentiated products and compete in a duopoly market. Both rms have an
opportunity to invest in a risky innovation technology which may reduce production cost. If
a rm makes an investment up front, i.e., before learning about the technology, it is informed
privately at the intermediate stage whether the innovation succeeds. Meanwhile, the same
information can be acquired at a cost and traded on by some investors (speculators) in the
stock market. The second rm can then decide whether to invest in the same technology
after observing the leaders and its own share prices. The innovation progress of one rm
may consequently be leaked via share price movements to its competitor. When this leakage
is factored in rmsdecisions ex ante, it provides rms with an option to delay the investment
decision till learning more about the innovation prospect from share prices.
This channel of information leakage is distinct from the one via mandatory disclosures
in two ways. Firstly, the extent of the latter is limited to R&D expenses, R&D acquisition
3See for instance Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007), Bakke and Whited (2010), Edmans, Goldstein and
Jiang (2012), Fresard (2012), Zuo (2013) among others.
4Choi (1991) uses an example of the break-through of cold super-conductivity in 1986 by IBM. IBMs
intermediate success made other rms more optimistic about this technology and increase their investment
intensity. Similarly, Austin (1993) observes in the biotech industry that an intermediate success in R&D of
one rm leads to an increase in the valuation of its competitors. Shi and Du (2012) document similar results
by investigating knowledge spillovers among publicly listed rms.
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and contracting,5 while stock prices aggregate private information from various sources and
may thus serve better to reveal the true investment prospect. Secondly and more fundamen-
tally, industry characteristics a¤ect both the option value of delay and speculatorstrading
incentives. This determines the probability and thus the consequence of the leakage via share
price movements. The indirect information leakage has a real impact on the investment out-
come when the option of delay is useful to the follower rm and at the same time speculators
have su¢ cient incentives to trade.
More specically, I show that the option value increases in the probability of infor-
mation leakage and the degree of competition in the product market (characterized by the
degree of product substitution). It however decreases in the market size as well as the prof-
itability of the investment. When the values of corresponding parameters are moderate, the
option helps to reduce the resources allocated on unproductive innovations and to encourage
e¤ective investments made by the follower rm. Information leakage is not useful if the op-
tion value is too low since both rms would prefer to invest up front. It can even be harmful.
This is the case if a potential leader stops investing up front, because he anticipates imitation
by a follower typically when the option is very valuable. The resulting competition reduces
the benet from innovating so much as to get no rm to be willing to invest up front. In
this case learning is impossible and the technology is never adopted.
These e¤ects of information leakage may become part of the equilibrium if information
production in the stock market is achievable. That is, if the cost of information acquisition to
speculators is comparatively smaller than their expected trading prot. When this is not the
5See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 2, 68, 141 and 142.
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case, the exit of speculators reduces stock price informativeness and consequently the option
value. I show that an increase in market competition augments speculatorstrading prot
by enlarging the advantage to the leader rm thanks to a successful innovation as well as the
disadvantage to the follower. Speculators are also more incentivized to participate given an
increase in either investment protability or market size of the industry. As a consequence,
information production in the stock market and improved e¢ ciency of investment may be
both achieved when the investment is relatively protable and it takes place in a su¢ ciently
large market where the level of competition is moderate. When a strong trading incentive of
speculators coincides with a high option value, the leader rm is deterred from investing up
front. This is the case if the competition is intense, especially so in a small market. Having
both the option value and information leakage endogenized in a model thus helps to reveal
the real impact of price e¢ ciency in the nancial market.
These results show that the indirect information leakage may be most benecial in
an industry during the growth phase, where the investment return, the market size and
competition level are comparably larger (higher) than at the introduction stage and lower
than the maturity stage. Under those conditions, we should observe empirically that the
investments of follower rms are more sensitive to share price movements of industry leaders.
Moreover, there should be a higher correlation of specic stock returns between leader rms
and followers. While providing cross-sectional characteristics, these implications are mostly
consistent with the empirical evidence uncovered in recent studies. Foucault and Frésard
(2012) nd a positive relationship between a rms investment and the market valuation
of its peers selling related products, the signicance of which increases in the stock price
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informativeness of the peers and the correlation of product demand. These authors however
do not consider the level of competition in the industry. Ozoguz and Rebello (2013) document
similar results and further show that this link is stronger in an industry with faster growth
and greater dependence on capital.
This paper also provides additional implications by modelling the two-way causality
between product market interactions and share price informativeness, which is little men-
tioned in the literature. For example, the theoretical model of Foucault and Frésard (2012)
allows only one duopoly rm the opportunity to expand the production capacity based on
the information revealed from share prices, while the competitor of this rm cannot react.6
As pointed out previously, however, when information production in the stock market is
feasible, the leader may be deterred from investing up front in anticipation of an imitation
by the follower. This is the case given a high level of competition especially in a relatively
small market. The model thus predicts that, under this condition, there is fewer R&D in-
vestments in the industry and the link becomes weaker between one rms investment and
price movements of its competitorsand its own stock. The correlation of rms specic
stock returns is also lower. These conjectures can be easily overlooked when one neglects
the feedback from share prices on rmsex-ante decisions.
This paper relates to the research on the interaction between product market compe-
tition and rmsnancing decision. An exogenous cost (probability) of information leakage
is usually imposed, typically in the studies focused on the trade-o¤between a cheaper capital
6Similarly, in the paper of Spiegel and Tookes (2008) who investigate rmsnancing choices for innovation
investment in a dynamic duopoly, only one rm can invest in the technology up front. The impact of the
waiting option on the ex-ante nancing decision is not considered.
17
raised from the equity market and more intensive competition caused by information disclo-
sures7. Although this paper stays away from rmsnancing problem, whether stock price
movements reveal innovation-related information and its extent, depending on industrial
characteristics, may add extra concerns to rmsnancing decisions.
This paper contributes to the literature of rmsstrategies in industries with weak in-
tellectual property protection, and particularly to process innovation that attracts relatively
less attention compared to product innovation. Often related to cost reduction, process in-
novation is on average more di¢ cult to be patented and less costly to copy compared to
product innovation. Good examples include the "no frills" revolution in air travel started by
South West Airlines, computerized reservation initiated by IBM and American Airlines, and
the implementation of radio frequency identication system by Wal-Mart and Metro AG.
These pioneering rms could hardly prevent their competitors from adopting a similar tech-
nology, while the second-mover advantage to the followers may be prominent. The general
features of a process innovation are thus contained in the model proposed in this paper.
This paper also complements the innovation literature on knowledge spillover that is
mostly related to voluntary or strategic disclosures.8 As shown by Gal-Or (1986) and Raith
(1996), voluntary disclosure is not optimal to rms in the context of price competition when
there exists an ex-ante uncertainty in the production cost. The model of indirect information
leakage via share prices may provide a better framework to capture the knowledge spillover
7See Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Spiegel and Tookes,
2008; Chod and Lyandres, 2011, among others, for discussions about how di¤erent sources of nancing,
private debt or equity, a¤ect rmsinnovation strategies, and the intensity of product market competition.
8See Jansen (2005 and 2008), Magazzini, Pammolli, Riccaboni and Rossi (2009), among others, who
investigate rms disclosure strategies regarding their innovations given the presence of product market
competition.
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among rms that compete in price.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the setup of the model. Firms
equilibrium strategies are computed in Section 2.3, and speculatorsparticipation and the
endogenized information leakage are discussed in Section 2.4. Empirical implications are
explained in Section 2.5. An extension is put in Section 2.6 regarding the welfare in the
product market and the participation of noise traders. Section 2.7 concludes. Proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
The timeline The timing of the model is described in Figure 2..1. There are four dates. Both
rms have an opportunity to invest in a risky innovation at either date 0 or date 1. If one
rm invests in this innovation at date 0, it will know privately at the next date whether this
innovation succeeds. Once an investment takes place in one rm, speculators can acquire
private information about the success of the innovation and trade on this information if it is
protable. If the other rm decides not to invest at date 0, it can choose whether or not to
do so at date 1 after observing the share prices at date 1. Firms then compete in the product
market at both dates 2 and 3, and they liquidate at the end of date 3. Next, I explain the
set-up in detail.
The product market The duopoly rm i and j produce di¤erentiated products without
capacity constraints. They produce and sell at dates 2 and 3. At date 0, the rms possess
the same production technology and face an innovation decision that requires an investment
I. This innovation will either decrease a rms marginal production cost by  with probability
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Figure 2..1: The Timeline
 or make no change with probability (1  ),  2 (0; 1) and 0 <  < c. The success of the
innovation is assumed to be perfectly correlated across rms regardless of the timing of
innovation, and this is common knowledge.9
For simplicity, I assume that the investment cost, I, remains unchanged from date
0 to date 1. I also assume that it takes two periods for the invested innovation to exert
inuence on cost reduction. More specically, if one rm invests at date 0, and the innovation
succeeds, production costs at date 2 and 3 are (c  ). If the rm invests at date 1 instead,
its production cost at date 2 stays at c, and if the innovation succeeds, the cost changes
to c    at date 3 only. If the innovation of the leader rm is found to be e¤ective, the
follower innovating at date 1 may thus be disadvantaged in the rst-stage product market
competition at date 2. This captures a cost of waiting to innovate. The opportunity to
9This assumption is plausible given that innovation depends on technological feasibility which is funda-
mental and largely comparable among rms in the same industry. It can be relaxed by having an exogenous
correlation between the success of the innovation of each rm, which would still make information leakage a
problem. Therefore, it would not change the qualitative result in this paper.
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invest in this innovation is no longer available after the end of date 1. Firmsdecision to
invest in innovation is also assumed to be publicly observable.10 To make the computations
more tractable, I follow most of the literature by assuming that the duopolists share the
information about production cost just before setting prices.11
Following Singh and Vives (1984), I assume that there exists a representative con-
sumer in the economy, who maximizes at both date 2 and 3 his utility function U(qi; qj)  
2P
i=1
piqi, when consuming a quantity qi and qj of goods respectively from rm i and j at price
pi and pj. U(qi; qj) is quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in qi and qj,
U(qi; qj) = (qi + qj)  1
2
 
q2i + 2qiqj + q
2
j

; (2..1)
where  > 0 and 0 <  < 1. The parameter  measures the substitutability between the
goods produced by two rms12. The higher is , the closer substitutes rmsproducts are
and thus the ercer their competition is. The following demand function for the goods of
rm i maximizes the utility of the representative consumer,
qi =
(  pi)   (  pj)
1  2 (2..2)
provided that quantities are positive. Consequently, rm i sets price pi to maximize its prot
10This may be obligatory for the rms due to disclosure requirement, particularly when the innovation
investment is nanced by the issuance of equity. This assumption also allows me to focus on the pure
equilibrium strategy.
11More drastic restrictions on the communication about production cost may not only lead to a convolution
in results due to the e¤ects from di¤erent sources, but also yield additional welfare losses since communication
between competing rms enables more e¢ cient decision making in product market (Kuhn and Vives, 1995).
By simplifying the information structure that is less relevant to rmsinnovation decisions, I can draw clearer
inferences about the impact of the feedback e¤ect regarding the innovation progress.
12The qualitative results of this paper hold if  2 ( 1; 0), that is, if the products are complements.
However, if rms produce complementary goods, it is optimal for the leader to communicate the innovation
progress when the innovation succeeds. The leakage via share prices becomes superuous. I therefore neglect
the discussion for  2 ( 1; 0).
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i,
i = (pi   ci) (  pi)   (  pj)
1  2 . (2..3)
qj and j of rm j are symmetric to (2..2) and (2..3).
The stock market Three types of agents exist in the stock market: a noise trader, two
speculators and a market maker. The noise trader buys or sells 1 unit of each listed rm
for liquidity reason. Trading of the noise trader is uncorrelated across stocks. I endogenize
the trading incentive of the noise trader in Section 2.6 (Extension). Two speculators can
acquire at date 1 the private knowledge regarding rmsinnovation progress and trade on
this information if protable. The speculators can only submit market orders. Finally, the
market maker is assumed to be competitive and provide liquidity by setting the share prices
based on his rational expectation of a rms value when observing the submitted orders. The
market maker earns zero prot in expectation.
Share trading is assumed to occur at date 1 after innovating rms learns the true
prospect of the technology. Order ows in the stock market are publicly observable. When
only one rm innovates at date 0, this information can be used by their competitor to decide
whether to innovate at date 1. Speculators reap their trading prots at date 2 when the
e¤ectiveness of the innovation is observed and rms produce and sell. Note that I assume no
other information leakage or spillover in this economy. Consequently no private knowledge
about innovation progress will be revealed without informed trading in the stock market.
Also, if no investment is made at date 0, speculators cannot know whether this innovation
will be successful, and hence they will not trade.
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2.3 FirmsEquilibrium Strategies
A benchmark model with no feedback I consider rst the case in which there is no stock
market. As previously specied, rms know their rivalsmarginal production cost just before
they enter price competition. The representative consumer chooses quantities of goods (qi; qj)
to maximize the utility function given in (2::1), and each rm maximizes its prot given in
(2::3). By deriving the rst order condition of the prot function with respect to pi, rm is
best response function of price can be obtained as below13,
pi =
1
2
[ (1  ) + pj + ci] . (2..4)
Solving the system of best response functions of rm i, we can obtain the equilibrium price
pi for rm i,
pi =
 (1  )
2   +
2ci + cj
4  2 . (2..5)
The expression of pj is symmetric to (2..5). For simplication, I assume  > c+

2  2 such
that qi and qj are positive 8ci; cj 2 fc; c  g. Using the equilibrium price pi and pj , and the
demand function qi established in (2..2), I can then state rm is prot in equilibrium as a
function of ci and cj,
ci;cj =
1  
(1 + ) (2  )2

(  ci) +  (cj   ci)
(2 + ) (1  )
2
. (2..6)
Firm js prot cj ;ci is symmetric to (2..6).
Formula (2..6) shows that rm is prot increases in its competitors cost cj. It is
thus not optimal for rms to reveal voluntarily their innovation progress before the product
13This is the Bertrand reaction function of rm i, provided qj is positive.
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market competition.14 Due to the absence of information leakage in the benchmark case, it
is never optimal to invest at date 1 if no rm invests at date 0. This therefore leaves two
pure strategies to each rm, either to "invest in innovation at date 0", denoted by L, or "not
to invest at all", denoted by N .
Strategy L and N complete rmsaction space 
 in the benchmark case, 
 = fL;Ng.

 provides four possible combinations of strategies (Ai; Aj) chosen by rm i and its com-
petitor j, and each combination leads to a di¤erent expected prot for both rms at either
date 2 or 3. Since rms have the same action space and symmetric payo¤s, the discussion
of mixed strategies does not render additional insights and is therefore skipped. I restrict
attention to pure strategy equilibrium in this paper.
To facilitate the illustration hereafter, I rst compute and compare rmsprot ci;cj
under each realization of their production cost, ci; cj 2 fc; c  g.
Lemma 1 The size of rm is prot ci;cj is ranked as follows: c ;c > c ;c  > c;c >
c;c .
Given the success rate of the innovation , we can then compute the expectation of
rm is payo¤, denoted by i, under each strategy pair (Ai; Aj) chosen from 
. i (Ai; Aj)
consists of rm is prot at both date 2 and 3 as well as the cost of innovation if the investment
is to take place. As a result, the expected net prot of rm i is 2c ;c  +2 (1  )c;c  I
if both rms choose L, and 2c;c if both choose N . If, however, only rm i invests in the
innovation, i (L;N) = 2c ;c + 2 (1  )c;c   I and j (N;L) = 2c;c  + 2 (1  )c;c.
14Firm i has no incentive to reveal a good progress of its innovation. Neither would it reveal bad news,
since otherwise its competitor could perfectly infer the incidence of a successful innovation.
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Assume that a rm chooses not to invest if (Ai; Aj) = 0. I derive the Nash equilibria and
present the equilibrium conditions in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If I  I, (N , N) is the unique Nash equilibrium; if I < I, (L, L) is the
unique Nash equilibrium; and if I > I  I, there are two equilibria: (N , L) & (L, N),
where I = 2 (c ;c    c;c ), and I = 2 (c ;c   c;c)
Figure 2..2: FirmsEquilibrium Strategies - Without Leakage (Prop.1)
This gure shows rmsequilibrium strategies without information leakage in a numerical example with
 = 6, c = 3,  = 2 and  = 34 . (N;N) marks the parameter region of no rm investing in equilibrium.
(L;L) marks the region of both rm investing, and (L;N) & (N;L) only one rm investing in equilibrium.
The black lines are the thresholds, I and I , dened in Propostion 1.
I plot in Figure 2..2 the equilibrium strategies for a numerical example, in which  = 3
4
,
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c = 3,  = 2 and the demand parameter  = 6. The parameter values remain unchanged for
the illustrations throughout the paper, unless indicated di¤erently. The required investment
I for the innovation is scaled on the vertical axis and the success rate  is on the horizontal
axis. The thresholds in the scale of required investment, I15 and I, separate three regions
that represent rmsstrategies in di¤erent equilibria. Notice that both thresholds increase
in the success rate () as well as the magnitude of the cost reduction (). Intuitively, the
investment in an innovation technology is more likely to be taken when the innovation has
a high probability to succeed and brings a bigger advantage in product market competition.
Equilibrium in a model with feedback I now introduce the stock market to the economy, where
speculators acquire and trade on their private information about rmsinvestment prospect.
I assume that with probability ,  2 (0; 1), share prices are fully informative about the
value of the innovation invested at date 0. With probability (1  ), share prices reveal no
private information.  is endogenized in Section 2.4. All other assumptions regarding the
competition in the product market remain as previously stated. The equilibrium is now
dened as, for a given , the investment strategies chosen by rms that maximize expected
rm value.
Compared to the benchmark which is a special case with  = 0, the private informa-
tion about one rms innovation progress is leaked to its competitor via share price. This
additional ingredient introduces an option: a rm can now choose to wait and make the
decision at the intermediate stage (date 1) after observing share prices. If no rm invests in
the innovation at date 0, there will be no private information for the speculator to acquire
15The lower threshold I is zero when the degree of substitution converges to 1 (i.e., the perfect substitution).
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and trade on, and consequently prices will contain no relevant information. Product market
competition still takes place at date 2 and 3.
When prices reveal bad news, it is obvious that a follower would never invest since the
investment would be a pure waste. When prices are not informative, a rm choosing not to
invest upfront has to decide whether to follow based on its prior belief. Continuing with the
notation "L" and "N" as in the benchmark case, I add two others for the strategies of the
follower rm: "F" denoting the strategy "to invest at date 1 only when share prices reveal
good news about the innovation", and " eF" denoting "to invest at date 1 when share prices
reveal good news or no private information". The action space for each rm now consists of
four pure strategies, 
 = fL; F; ~F ;Ng. Lemma 2 points out that ~F cannot be an equilibrium
strategy, however.
Lemma 2 It is a strictly dominated strategy to invest in the innovation at date 1 with no
additional information from the stock market, i.e., eF is a strictly dominated strategy.
The other strategies fL; F;Ng survive in equilibrium. For a given  (the probability
of information leakage), Proposition 3 summarize rmsstrategies in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If  > 1
2
, strategy F cannot be sustained in equilibrium, and thus the equi-
librium remains as in the description of Proposition 1. If   1
2
, the equilibrium strategies
are as follows.
If I < (2 )
2(1 )I, (L;L) is the unique Nash equilibrium;
if (2 )
2(1 )I  I < min
n
~I; 1
2
I
o
, there are two equilibria: (L; F ) & (F;L);
if 1
2
I  I < I, there are two equilibria: (L;N) & (N;L);
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and if ~I  I < min1
2
I; I
	
or if I  I, (N;N) is the unique equilibrium.
I and I are dened as in Proposition 1, and ~I = (2  )c ;c + c ;c    2c;c.
Figure 2..3: FirmsEquilbrium Strategies - With Leakage
This gure shows rmsequilibrium strategies with information leakage in an example with  = 34 (other
parameters taking the same values as in Figure 2). (L;F ) & (F;L) marks the region in which given  = 34
one rm chooses to lead and the other rm chooses to follow after learning good news from share prices.
When  increases from 0 to 34 , the thresholds of strategy F , 
~I and (2 )2(1 )I , are shifted rightwards from
the dotted lines to the solid lines.
Note that to assure the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, I assume that the
value of parameter  is not too high such that ~I > (2 )
2(1 )I for  =
1
2
, i.e.,  < c +
 8 4+(2( 2+)+)
2(2+)(1 ) .
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I plot in Figure 2..3 the thresholds of equilibrium strategies in Proposition 2 in solid
lines in contrast to the dotted ones from Proposition 1. Proposition 2 shows that rms
strategies in equilibrium remains unchanged from the benchmark case if the investment
costs more than 1
2
I. This is the condition for the follower rm not to invest at date 1
even if share prices reveal good news. In addition, choosing F is no longer optimal for the
follower rm when the success probability  is above 1
2
. The intuition is that strategy F is
preferable only if the wasteful investment  (1  ) I avoided by using the option of waiting
outweighs the expected benet  (c ;c    c;c ) during the market competition at date
3, i.e., I > 
2(1 )I. If  >
1
2
, this condition contradicts the threshold for investing upon good
news at date 1 (i.e., I < 1
2
I ).
Moreover, the new strategy F and thus the option of waiting lead to fundamental
changes in Proposition 2 compared to the benchmark case. To illustrate, I rst dene the
option value of waiting.
Lemma 3 The option value of waiting is the benet to a rm from choosing the strategy F
over L given its competitor chooses L, that is, (2  )  (c;c    c ;c ) + (1  ) I.
The option value consists of two parts. The rst part is the sum of the potential loss in
the competition at both date 2 and date 3 if the innovation succeeds, which are respectively
 (c;c    c ;c ) and (1  )  (c;c    c ;c ). The second part is the amount of in-
vestment saved from waiting, (1  ) I, where  is the joint probability of good news being
revealed. In other words, the option value is the di¤erence between (F;L) and (L;L).
The option value equals zero at the lower threshold of (L; F ) & (F;L) in the investment
cost, (2 )
2(1 )I. When I is above this threshold, (L;L) is replaced by (L; F ) & (F;L) since it
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is optimal for one rm to take advantage of the option and act as the follower. The option
value is even higher in the parameter region where a rm switches its strategy from N to
F and invests upon good news at date 1. The e¢ ciency in the product market is improved
in (L; F ) & (F;L) due to either a more e¤ective investment at the intermediate stage or a
reduced wasteful investment, since the follower rm can now invest with a better knowledge
about the innovation.
On the other hand, (L;N) & (N;L) are replaced by (N;N) in the region where
strategy F reduces the innovation rent of the potential leader to the extent that he no
longer prots from investing at date 0. In this scenario, the technology is never adopted and
learning about its value is impossible. The information leakage leads to a lower e¢ ciency in
production. We thus observe a new threshold ~I between (N;N) and (L; F ) & (F;L), that
is below I.
We now take a look at how the option value varies with stock price informativeness
as well as the characteristics of the innovation and the product market.
Proposition 3 The option value of waiting increases in the probability of information leak-
age , the degree of competition  and the investment cost I. It decreases in the success rate
, the size of cost reduction  and the demand parameter .
Firstly, it is intuitive that the option is more valuable when share prices are informa-
tive with a higher probability (), since it becomes more likely for the follower to learn at
date 1 the true prospect. Meanwhile, a higher  also imposes a larger cost of information
leakage to the leader rm such that the up-front investment is more likely to be deterred.
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The consequence is that both thresholds (2 )
2(1 )I and 
~I shift towards the right in Figure
2..3.
The option value decreases when the protability of the innovation investment in-
creases due to a higher benet from investing up front. Investment protability is character-
ized by the parameters , I and . Let us look at Figure 2..3. When the success rate is small
(e.g., at point A) for a given I, the option prevents the follower from wasting its investment
with a high probability. The protability at this point is however su¢ ciently low to the
potential leader given that its competitor is likely to follow. In contrast, the option value
becomes so small when I < (2 )
2(1 )I such that F is no longer optimal, whilst at point B, the
size of protability and option value su¢ ce to accommodate the incentive to both the leader
and the follower. The same reasoning can be applied regarding the required investment I
and the size of cost reduction .16
Figure 2..4 shows the impact of industry competition and the market size on equilib-
rium strategies, with  = 0:4 and other parameters remaining unchanged. When  increases,
products of rm i and j become closer substitutes, and the competition level in the industry
increases. While both c ;c  and c;c  drop for a higher , the decreases of c ;c  is
more signicant. This is because having the same production cost as its competitor, a rm
is obliged to reduce more its product price under a higher level of competition in order to
attract demand from the consumer. Expecting its competitor to invest at date 0, a rm
thus has a lower incentive to invest at the same time. The option value increases in . For
example, at point A in Figure 2..4 the option of delay has a low value such that both rms
16See Figure A1 in the Appendix for rmsequilibrium strategies when the size of cost reduction varies.
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Figure 2..4: FirmsEquilbrium Strategies - Demand/Competition
This gure shows the impact of industry competition and the market size on rmsstrategies in
equalibrium. The dotted lines represent the thresholds of the benchmark case. When the probability of
information leakage increases, these thresholds are shifted upwards. The solid lines represent the thresholds
for  = 34 .
invest up front. When  increases to point B, one rm takes the option to wait. While
at point C, the innovation rent to the leading rm becomes too low and (N;N) emerges
in equilibrium. Note that the information leakage does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome
when  is approaching 1, i.e., products become perfect substitutes.
Figure 2..4 also shows the impact of the demand parameter  that is associated with
the market size. Using the demand function in (2..2) and the equilibrium price in (2..5),
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we can obtain the demand intercept and the price elasticity of demand17. It is then easy
to see that a higher  leads to a larger intercept of demand and a lower price elasticity,
and therefore a larger market size in the industry. When the consumption expands given
a higher , a successful innovation brings a more signicant advantage in competition and
thus a stronger incentive for rms to invest up front. The option value of delay drops as a
consequence.
It is clear so far that, the information leakage with a given probability  is benecial
to an industry when the innovation is associated with a relatively high protability and
a su¢ cient market size and when the competition is not too intense. Informative prices
encourage innovations and improve the e¢ ciency of innovation investment. This may t an
industry at the growth stage of its life cycle, in which incremental innovations are frequently
needed and often more protable, and the competition is lower. The opposite can be said for
industries at the stage of maturity, where the competition is intense and the improvements
on the prevailing technologies carry small impact on production.
In the next section, I discuss speculatorstrading strategies and how the probability
of information leakage is endogenized in this economy.
2.4 Participation of Speculators
Trading strategies Assume that both rms are publicly listed and each of the two speculators
are assumed to trade only one rms shares, though they may have access to the private
information about both rms. This assumption, simplifying the discussion of the trading
17The demand intercept equals 1+ , and the price elasticity of demand Edi equals   1 2 piqi .
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part of the game, can be justied by limits on exposure that a trader is willing to take. Let
us denote the order submitted by the speculator of rm i and j by xi and xj, respectively.
Recall that if no investment takes place at date 0, speculators do not trade at the next date
since no private information is there for acquiring, thus xi = xj = 0.
When at least one rm invests at date 0, speculators can acquire perfect information
about the true state of the world !, ! 2 fs; fg. ! = s if the innovation is successful,
and ! = f otherwise. Speculatorsorders are thus functions of !, i.e., xi (!) and xj (!).
Although speculators are allowed to choose any order size to submit, they follow nevertheless
the optimal trading strategy dened by the lemma below.
Lemma 4 When both rms invest at date 0, if speculators learn ! = s, i.e., the inno-
vation will succeed,
8>><>>:
xi (s) = 1
xj (s) = 1
and if they learn ! = f , i.e., the innovation will fail,
8>><>>:
xi (f) =  1
xj (f) =  1
.
When only rm i invests at date 0, if speculators learn ! = s,
8>><>>:
xi (s) = 1
xj (s) =  1
, and
if they learn ! = f
8>><>>:
xi (f) =  1
xj (f) = 1
. The strategies are symmetric when only rm j invests
at date 0.
Recall that the noise trader buys or sells 1 unit of both rms shares with equal
probability and there is no correlation of their orders across rms. Let Xi and Xj denote the
total order ow of rm i and of rm j. It is straightforward to see that the trading direction
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of speculators are hidden if Xi = Xj = 0, and their private information about ! is not
revealed. If we assume that information acquisition incurs no cost, both speculators trade
actively when at least one rm invests in the innovation. Lemma 5 follows immediately.
Lemma 5 When both speculators are active, the probability of information leakage () is
3
4
.
Speculators prot The probability of leakage  may however vary with the trading incentive
of speculators once we impose an information cost. To understand this, I rst compute
speculatorsexpected prot and show how the protability of their information acquisition
can be a¤ected.
Recall that trading is protable to speculators only when Xi = Xj = 0, which occurs
with probability 1
4
. If rm i invests as a leader at date 0, we know from Lemma 2 that rm
j does not invest if Xi = Xj = 0. Given that the prot functions of both rms are publicly
known, the market maker is then able to anticipate the optimal strategy of rm j and quotes
the price Pi and Pj as exactly the expected rm values, if Xi = Xj = 0. We can obtain the
expected trading prots of speculator i and j, denoted by 	i (L; F ) and 	j (F;L), which
are respectively  (1  ) (c ;c   c;c) and  (1  ) (c;c   c;c ).18 It is easy to observe
	i (L; F ) > 	j (F;L). When both rms invest at date 0, private information contained in
share prices is no longer used for rmsdecision making. In this case, the market maker
quotes the same price for two rms, Pi = Pj = i;j (L;L) , and both speculators expect to
earn  (1  ) (c ;c    c;c).
18Note that the expected trading prots of speculators in the parameter region (L;N) & (N;L) have the
same expressions.
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Speculatorstrading prots are not related to the investment cost I, due to the as-
sumption that rmsinvestment actions can be observed by all agents. The next proposition
summarizes the impact of other parameters on speculatorstrading prots.
Proposition 4 Regardless of rmsstrategies in equilibrium, speculatorsexpected trading
prot increases in both  and .
If (L;L) is the equilibrium strategy, speculatorsprot decreases in ;
If rm i invests as the leader, speculator is prot 	i (L; F ) increases in  for  <
, and decreases in  otherwise; while speculator js prot 	j (F;L) increases in  for
 > , and decreases in  otherwise, where  = c +
(8 82+44 6)
(1 )2(8 62+43+74+25) and  =
c+
(4+2 24)
(1 )2(2+)(4+2+42+33) ,  > .
Intuitively, the size of cost reduction  has a positive impact on the protability of
the investment and therefore the dispersion of rmspayo¤s, provided that at least one rm
invests in the innovation. Similarly, a higher , associated with a bigger market size, enlarges
the leaders advantage as well as the followers disadvantage in competition.
The e¤ect of the competition level () is less straightforward. As shown previously,
speculator is prot depends on the di¤erence between c ;c and c;c. Assuming rm i
chooses to be the leader and its innovation succeeds, an increase of  has two e¤ects: a
negative impact on the product price and a positive impact on the demand. The net e¤ect
depends on the market size. For  < , a higher  and thus a higher competition level
enables the leader rm to seize a higher market share that is su¢ cient to compensate the
price impact, and thus (c ;c c;c) increases. The dominance of the demand impact becomes
weaker when the market size increases, i.e., @
2
i	i(L;F )
@@
< 0, and it is eventually reversed when
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 > . Similarly, speculator js prot depends on the di¤erence between c;c and c;c . In
a su¢ ciently large market, intense competition reduces the follower rms market share and
pricing power more than when both rms have the same production cost. This e¤ect goes
down when  becomes smaller, i.e.,
@2j	j(F;L)
@@
> 0, and it is reversed if  < . At last, if
(L;L) is chosen in equilibrium, two rms are equally positioned in competition. An increase
in  reduces rmspayo¤ more signicantly when the innovation succeeds (the production
cost is lower) than otherwise, i.e.,
@ci;cj
@@ci
> 0 if ci = cj. Consequently, speculatorsexpected
trading prot decreases in .
Endogenized information leakage Let us now assume that it costs  for each speculator to
acquire information about the innovation progress. Speculators will participate only when
their net expected payo¤ is positive, i.e.,  < 	. As a result, three possible outcomes can arise
corresponding to the size of  relative to other parameters: both speculators stop acquiring
information (i.e. exit the market) and rms chooses strategies at date 0 as in the benchmark
(Proposition 1); both speculators are active; the speculator earning a higher expected prot
remains active while the other one quits. The third outcome can occur in equilibrium in
which only one rm chooses the strategy L and the expected prot of the speculator of the
follower rm is not su¢ cient to cover the information cost . Recall that the information
acquisition of speculators take place after observing rmsactions at date 0. In equilibrium,
rmsinnovation strategies correspond to the number of active speculators in expectation.
The equilibrium is thus dened as follows: (i) A trading strategy for speculators
that maximizes their expected payo¤s, given the investment strategies of the rms, (ii)
the investment strategies by the rms that maximize expected rm value given all other
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strategies, (iii) a price-setting strategy by the market maker that allows him to break even
in expectation, given the strategies taken by the speculators and rms.
We next have a look at the case that should both speculators trade actively, only
rm i invests at date 0 in equilibrium and speculator i earns a higher expected prot than
speculator j. If the parameter values are such that  is between 	i (L; F ) and 	j (F;L) and
speculator j exits the market. This leaves speculator i the only informed trader in the stock
market, thereafter called the monopoly speculator. Share prices become less informative with
a monopoly speculator, since the market maker can no longer update his belief about the
state of the world based on the order ows of both rms. See the Appendix for a complete
proof for the following lemma.
Lemma 6 With a monopoly speculator, the probability of information leakage () is 1
2
.
Relating to Proposition 2 and 3, we know that both rms are inclined to innovate at
date 0 when the protability of the innovation investment is particularly high (i.e., a large
). In this case, speculators have strong incentives to trade, but the information is less useful
to rms in the product market. It is similar regarding the market size that a very high 
provides speculators with a strong incentive to trade while the information leakage has little
impact on the investment outcome. Under the opposite conditions (a very small  or ),
speculators have a low incentive to acquire information, while the option is very valuable
such that information leakage could deter the potential leader. Nevertheless, the lack of price
informativeness may actually help to alleviate this problem.
We can now look at the equilibrium outcome with an endogenous information leakage.
To visualize how it is di¤erent from having an exogenous probability of leakage, I present two
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Figure 2..5: Equilbrium - Endogenous Leakage (High )
This gure shows the equilibrium outcome of a numerical example in which the information cost is
su¢ ciently high ( = 2:1) such that there may be a monopoly speculator trading in the stock market. The
grey solid line is the cuto¤ for the monopoly trading prot to be equal to the information cost. Below the
grey line, the monopoly speculator does not acquire information and thus there is no informed trading.
numerical examples separately in Figure 2..5 and 2..6, with respectively a high information
acquisition cost ( = 2:1) and a low cost ( = 0:2). Assume again that rm i is the leader.
Let us rst look at the example in Figure 2..5, in which the expected prot of speculator of
the follower rm j is not su¢ cient to cover the information cost and thus speculator j leaves
the market. Speculator i may remain active depending on the values of parameters  and
. The gray line represents the cuto¤ where the information cost is equal to the monopoly
trading prot of speculator i, i.e.,  = 	i (L; F ) j = 12 . Below this cuto¤ line, speculator i
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also stops acquiring information and hence there is no informed trading.
First, observe at point A in Figure 2..5 both a small market size and low competition
give su¢ cient disincentives to speculator i, such that the equilibrium goes back to (L;L) in
the benchmark case ( = 0). The outcome with an exogenous  being 1
2
at point A would
be (L; F ) & (F;L). The expected prot to speculator i at point C is still not su¢ cient
due to a small market size, and there is no information production in the stock market. As
a comparison, information leakage has a real impact at point B with a higher value of 
by enabling the follower rm to choose strategy F . Notice in the gridded region in Figure
2..5, where the competition is intense in the product market, the monopoly speculator has a
strong incentive and the option is valuable to the follower. This alignment deters the leader
from investing up front. Information leakage ( = 1
2
) switches the equilibrium from (L;N)
& (N;L) to (N;N).
Next, Figure 2..6 shows an example with a su¢ ciently low cost of information acqui-
sition such that the speculator of the follower rm may also have incentive to participate.
The gray line here represents the cuto¤of zero trading prot to the speculator of the follower
j, netting the information cost, i.e.,  = 	j (F;L) j = 34 . Therefore, below this cuto¤ line,
speculator j exits the market and leaves speculator i the monopoly trader. Consequently, 
becomes 1
2
below this cuto¤. Again, in Figure 2..6 the information leakage does not a¤ect
rmsstrategies at point A. Were the information leakage exogenous ( = 3
4
), the follower
rm would nd it optimal to use the option of waiting and choose F . Nevertheless, specula-
tor j does not trade at point A due to a low expectation of trading prot. As a comparison,
we observe that when  increases to point B, both speculators have incentive to trade while
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Figure 2..6: Equilbrium - Endogenous Leakage (Low )
This gure shows the equilibrium outcome of a numerical example with a low information cost ( = 0:2).
In this case, both speculator may be active in the market. The gray line represents the cuto¤ where the
speculator of the follower rm earns zero expected prot netting the information cost and he stops
acquiring information in the region below this cuto¤. The probability of information leakage drops from to
1
2
below the gray line.
the option value is su¢ cient for rm j to act as a follower and not too high to deter rm
i from investing up front. Price informativeness has a positive impact on the investment
outcome.
Now look at point C which has the same location as in the previous gure. When the
information is more expensive such that only speculator i stays active in the stock market,
as in Figure 2..5, the lack of trading incentive for the monopoly speculator at C leads to the
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equilibrium (L;N) & (N;L). Given a much lower information cost in the example here, the
equilibrium outcome becomes nevertheless (N;N). A high option value is now accompanied
by a strong trading incentive of the speculator of the follower rm. This deters the potential
leader and exerts a negative impact on the investment outcome.
These examples show clearly the di¤erence in the real impact of an endogenized
information leakage compared to an exogenous leakage. Conclusion 1 and 2 summarize the
discussions above.
Conclusion 1 Stock price informativeness improves the investment outcome when the prof-
itability of the investment and the market size are relatively large.
Conclusion 2 When speculatorstrading incentive varies with product market competition,
stock price informativeness worsens the investment outcome when the competition level is rel-
atively high in a small market. It may improve the investment e¢ ciency when the competition
is not so intense.
In addition, I show in Figure A2 in the Appendix a numerical example with a moderate
information cost ( = 1:05), in which the monopoly speculator i remains always active. At
the same location of point C, rmsequilibrium strategies are (L; F ) & (F;L). Comparing
it to Figure 2..5 and 2..6, we observe that the information cost has a non-monotonic e¤ect
on investment strategies in equilibrium.
Information cost depends on how di¢ cult it is to understand the nature of an innova-
tion technology and the true value of the technology to a certain industry. Cost of acquiring
information and trading to speculators can also come from low analyst coverage, low trans-
42
parency of rmsdisclosure policies and restrictions on short selling, which are often subject
to regulatory constraints. The regulatory concerns are particularly relevant to growing and
innovation-intensive industries that rely heavily on equity nancing due to volatile returns,
inherent riskiness of investment, and limited collateral value of intangible assets.19 Conclu-
sion 1 and 2 show that these industries may also benet largely from investment e¢ ciency
that is promoted by price e¢ ciency in the stock market. The non-monotonic impact of the
cost parameter  implies the intricacy in the related policies. A detailed discussion in this
regard is nevertheless beyond the scope of this paper.
2.5 Empirical Implications
The model provides empirical implications from two aspects. First, when information
leakage occurs via trading in the stock market, we expect to observe a link between the share
price of one rm and the investment taken by its competitor. More specically, discussions
in the previous section conclude that price e¢ ciency in the stock market enables rms to
act as followers when the market size and the investment protability are neither too small
nor too large. There may not be su¢ cient incentive for speculators to acquire information if
the parameter values are too small. Or in the opposite case, the option is not valuable and
both rms invest up front. The model thus provides the rst implication, which is a direct
consequence of Conclusion 1. See Table A3 in the Appendix for possible empirical proxies
for the models parameters.
IMPLICATION 1: The investment of followers is more sensitive to share price move-
19See Stiglitz (1985), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Hall (2002), and Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009).
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ments of leading competitors in an industry with a relatively large market size and protable
investment opportunities than otherwise.
Additionally, Conclusion 2 says information e¢ ciency in the stock market share prices
can have a negative e¤ect on the investment outcome depending on the competition intensity
in the industry. Proposition 3 states that the option of waiting becomes more valuable for a
higher . When the competition level rises, the alignment between speculatorsincentive and
the option value makes it possible for one rm to act as a follower. When market competition
is intense, it however drives out the up-front investment, especially in an industry with a
relatively small market where the competition advantage to the leader is low. Implication 2
thus follows.
IMPLICATION 2: The investment of followers is more sensitive to share price move-
ments of leading competitors when the level of competition increases in the product market.
This sensitivity is however weakened when competition becomes intense particularly in a
smaller market.
It is worth mentioning that one technology can be adopted at di¤erent timings and
brings di¤erent benets across industries, depending on the characteristics of each industry,
the functionality of the technology itself, and the development of supporting technologies. For
example, as a long-existed technology, the adoption timing of radio frequency identication
(RFID) system varies largely from the early 1990s in factory automation to the mid-late 2000s
in asset tracking in the retail and banking industry. Investment returns and implementation
risks vary accordingly. As a consequence, the relationship between investments and share
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prices should di¤er for a given technology adopted across industries and in di¤erent periods.
This gives another interpretation of Implication 1 and 2.
While providing cross-sectional characteristics, Implication 1 and 2 are mostly con-
sistent with the empirical evidence uncovered in recent studies. Foucault and Frésard (2012)
nd a positive relationship between a rms investment and the market valuation of its peers
selling related products, the signicance of which increases in the stock price informativeness
of the peers and the correlation of product demand. These authors however do not consider
the level of competition in the industry. Ozoguz and Rebello (2013) document similar re-
sults and further show that this link is stronger in an industry with faster growth, higher
competition and greater dependence on capital.
Analogically, we should observe the di¤erence in the correlation of rms specic
returns and their investment behaviors. Since the market return is not modelled in this
paper, the correlation of rmsspecic returns is equivalent to the price correlation. Consider
that both speculators are active. Stock prices of rms are perfectly correlated if they both
invest up front. In the parameter regions where (L;L) is replaced by (L; F ) & (F;L), price
correlation obviously goes down. Empirically, it should also be similar in the region where
(L;L) is replaced by (N;N) since the specic return related to this innovation investment
no long exists if no rm invests in it. On the other hand, the information leakage increases
the correlation in the parameter region where (L; F ) & (F;L) replace (L;N) & (N;L). This
is because with probability () the follower rm invests in the innovation and makes the
same prot as the leader during the product market competition at date 3, which reduces the
variance of market maker prices The amount of investment taken by rms also becomes larger
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in this region. In the parameter regions where (L;L) is replaced by (N;N), the correlation of
rmsspecic returns is reduced and so is the amount of investment. Implication 3 follows.
IMPLICATION 3: The model suggests that the correlation of rmsspecic returns is
positively related the amount of R&D investment made by rms. This link is stronger when
share prices are more informative.
Another observation is that a higher probability () of information leakage (e.g., a
second rm going public) may lead to a lower amount of investment in the industry. This
happens in equilibrium when speculators incentives are aligned with the option value of
waiting such that either one rm switches from L to F and invests only upon good news
(e.g., point B in Figure 2..5) or the leader is deterred from investing up front (e.g., point
C in Figure 2..6). A higher  can also lead to more investment in the region where the
non-leading rm switches from N to F and invests with a higher probability at date 1. This
thus provides a cross-section implication regarding the amount of R&D investment.
IMPLICATION 4: The amount of R&D investment may be lower in an industry in
which share prices of competing rms are more informative, the market size and investment
protability are larger and when the level of competition higher. It can also occur when the
competition is intense while the market size is relatively small.20
Foucault and Frésard (2012) nd that the investments of private rms, after they
go public, are less correlated to their peersshare prices because these rms can thereafter
20This may thus provide a partial explanation to the empirical evidence that public rms invest less and
hoard more cash than private rms. For instance, Asker et al. (2011) nd that compared to private rms,
public rms take fewer investments and they are less responsive to investment opportunities, and associate
their ndings with agency costs.
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learn from their own stock prices. The results in this paper suggest the cross-sectional
di¤erence in this aspect. The numbers of rms traded actively by speculators change the
probability of information leakage and thus the option value of waiting. When this is taken
into account in rmsdecisions ex-ante, as discussed previously, the characteristics of the
product market and the R&D investment determines whether rms invest in the same (or a
similar) innovation after the IPO of their rivals. It is summarized below.
IMPLICATION 5: After a private rm goes public, the sensitivity of its investment
to its competitors share prices increases if these rms are in an industry with a relatively
high competition and large market size, and if their R&D investments are associated with a
relatively high protability.
When managers can learn from the stock prices of other rms in the same industry,
they share the aggregated belief about the prospect of a certain technology and possibly
behave in a similar way. This indirect information leakage may thus contribute to explain why
public rms may rationally herd in their investment decisions (See for example Scharfstein
and Stein (1990)). That is, when price informativeness allows the follower rm to switch
from strategy N to F in equilibrium, rms have more correlated investment.
IMPLICATION 6: A higher correlation of R&D investments among publicly-listed
competing rms may be found in an industry with a relatively large market where both the
competition level and the investment protability are moderate.
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2.6 Extension
Surplus in the product market Regulators pay much attention to innovation investment at
rm level due to its vital impact on technological development in the economy. I therefore
discuss briey the changes in welfare due to the presence of the feedback from the stock
market. First, let us denote the consumer surplus by CS. Using the formula CS = U (qi; qj) 
piqi pjqj, with U(q1; q2) as the utility given in formula (2..1), it is straightforward to compute
the expectation of consumer surplus for each strategy prole (Ai; Aj), Ai; Aj 2 fL; F;Ng.
By comparing the ex-ante expectation of consumer surplus in di¤erent equilibria, I obtain
the proposition below.
Proposition 5 The expected consumer surplus increases in the expected amount of inno-
vation investment.
In other words, the expected consumer surplus descends by the order of (L;L), (L; F ),
(L;N), and nally (N;N). The information leakage via share prices is benecial to the con-
sumer when the non-leading rm choosing the strategy F overN compared to the benchmark
case. It, however, has a negative impact either when the potential leader is deterred from
investing at date 0 or when one rm switches its strategy from L to F . As a result, whether
consumers benet from having more information revealed from the stock market depends on
the parameter values in this economy.
Combining the consumer surplus and the expected rm prots, we can obtain the
expected total surplus (TS) in the product market. Using Proposition 2 and Proposition 5,
we know that the total surplus increases when the non-leading rm choose the strategy F
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over N , and it is reduced when rmsstrategies changes from (L;N) to (N;N).
Corollary 1 The expected total surplus in the product market is higher with a leader and
a follower rm than with only one rm investing. It is however reduced when the up-front
investment is deterred such that rmsstrategies change from (L;N) & (N;L) to (N;N).
Corollary 1 shows that the impact of information leakage on the total surplus in the
product market has a similar pattern as on consumer welfare, except that it is ambiguous in
the parameter region where (L;L) is replaced by (L; F ) and (F;L). However, it is certain
that when information leakage deters the potential leader from investing upfront, it not only
undermines production e¢ ciency but further reduces the total surplus in the product market.
Noise tradersprivate benet In this subsection, I extend the analysis by endogenizing the
participation of noise traders and explore the impact on the equilibrium outcome. The
assumption that noise traders are completely unconcerned about their trading prot is more
convenient rather than realistic. To relax this assumption, I assume that there exists for
each rm a continuum of noise traders with measure 1, who trade for exogenous needs of
liquidity. Noise traders are indexed by ki for rm i (ergo kj for rm j), which distinguishes
the magnitude of their private benet of having a position in the stock. I denote this benet
by b, bki = (1  ki)  , where  signies the common nature of the trading motive shared by
noise traders,  > 0. Noise traders are thus heterogeneous only in the size of private benet.
I dene the utility of noise trader ki as
uki =
8>><>>:
bki, if Xki = zi
0, otherwise
, zi 2 f 1; 1g , (2..7)
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where zi denotes the state of world and Xki is the trading order of the k
th noise trader of
rm i. Noise traders of each rm have the same preference for the size and sign of the orders
to submit. For instance, if zi =  1, the spectrum of noise traders of rm i are in need of
liquidity and Xki equals  1. The realizations of z are uncorrelated across rms, and noise
traderspreference between cash and share is decided by nature with equal probability.21
The realization of z is private information to noise traders.
Each noise trader plays strategically and thus participates only when the net expected
payo¤ is non-negative. As a result, there exists a kthi noise trader of rm i who is indi¤erent
between trading and otherwise, and all the others with ki > ki will quit the market. Based
on the same argument as in Section 2.3, the threshold ki determines the optimal trading size
of speculator i. By comparing speculator is expected prot to the kth noise traders private
benet, we can nd the threshold ki for the indi¤erent noise trader. We can express k

i as
ki =
8>><>>:
max
 
1  	i

; 0

, if 1  	i

< 0
min
 
1  	i

; 1

, if 1  	i

> 0
. (2..8)
where Si is the expected trading prot of speculator i. The result is summarized in the
lemma below.22
Lemma 7 When rm i innovates at date 0, rm js decision will be changed by the size
of private benet. If   2 (1  ) (c;c   c;c ), the feedback e¤ect no longer prevails and
rms choose their optimal strategies as stated in Proposition 1. If  2 (2 (1  ) (c;c  
21If noise traders expect to have a liquidity shock with a positive probability, there will be a higher
probability for them to prefer cash over equity. To simplify the illustration, I assume that there is no other
shock to the liquidity need of noise traders.
22For the purpose of presentation, I discuss the additional assumptions in the Proof of Lemma 6 in the
Appendix.
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c;c );  (1  ) (c ;c   c;c)], speculator i leaves the market and rmsoptimal strategies
are determined when speculator j trades as a monopolist, the feedback e¤ect is weakened as
described by Proposition 5. If  >  (1  ) (c ;c   c;c), both speculators trade actively,
and rmsequilibrium strategies follow Proposition 2.
2.7 Concluding remarks
The nancial market plays an important role in allocating scarce resource via in-
formation exchange and revelation given that prices contain information that can improve
capital allocation (Fama and Miller, 1972). The impact of information e¢ ciency on the real
economy starts to change when one takes into account the feedback e¤ect from prices on
corporate decisions, since the expected cash ows of the asset are endogenized in equilibrium.
This paper is an attempt to investigate this process when share prices from the secondary
market feed back to rms innovating strategies. Using a simple setup in a di¤erentiated
Bertrand duopoly, I model information leakage related to a risky process innovation, which
induces an intra-industry knowledge spillover and alters rmsex-ante decisions in innovation
investment. This information leakage then provides rms an option to invest as a follower
with better knowledge. It may also discourage the up-front investment and leads to a lower
e¢ ciency in the product market. This is the case if the leader rm anticipates that its in-
novation rent becomes insu¢ cient when being imitated by a follower rm. When it is costly
for traders in the stock market to acquire private information, the amount of information
leakage and hence its impact on the option value of waiting are both endogenized in equi-
librium. I show that stock price informativeness may worsen the investment outcome when
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there is intense competition in a relatively small market. The model therefore sheds light
on the two-way causality between the amount of information produced in the stock market
and the fundamentals in the real economy.
Even though this paper focuses on the context of innovation strategies, it provides a
framework that can be applied to a wide array of corporate decisions in practice, where the
payo¤ of one rms action is strategically a¤ected by similar actions taken by its competitors
or industry peers. Examples are, but not limited to, investments in enlarging production
capacities, vertical integrations for the purpose of reducing input price or operating cost,
and outsourcing strategies.
Finally, one relevant question to ask is that when rmspre-commitments or strate-
gic disclosures already prevail, how stock trading contributes to technological advances by
introducing additional information. It is interesting to explore whether share trading acts
to verify or to obscure the information being revealed via other channels23. It may also be
interesting to consider a di¤erent design of information structure. For instance, if rmsin-
vestment action can not be immediately observed, the information revealed via stock prices
may become more obscure. The optimal strategy of both rms and stock market partici-
pants will change accordingly. The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this
paper, but they may provide policy makers with implications in practice, particularly when
the characteristics of di¤erent industries are taken into account.
23Amir Ziv (1993) proves that when the incentive for truthful information sharing is endogenized, rms no
longer nd it in their interest to honestly disclose production information, particularly in a one-stage game
when information verication is not quite feasible.
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2.8 Appendix
Appendix A
Figure A1: Equilibrium Strategies - Cost Reduction
This gure shows rmsequilibrium strategies with information leakage in a numerical example with
 = 6; c = 3;  = 0:4;  = 3
4
. (N;N) marks the parameter region of no rm investing in equilibrium.
(L;L) marks the region of both rm investing, and (L;N) & (N;L) only one rm investing in equilibrium.
58
Figure A2: Equilibrium - Endogenous Leakage (Moderate )
This gure shows the equilibrium outcome of a numerical example in which the information cost is
moderate ( = 1). There may be a monopoly speculator staying active in the stock market. The grey solid
line is the cuto¤ for the monopoly trading prot to be equal to the information cost. Below the grey line,
the monopoly speculator does not acquire information and thus there is no informed trading. Point C in
the gure is at the exactly the same location as in Figure 5 and 6. Observe that the equilibrium is now
switched to (L; F ) & (F;L) since given a lower information cost compared to Figure 5, the speculator of
the leader rm now has incentive to acquire information and trade.
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Appendix B: Proofs Proof of Lemma 1. It is easy to compute rmsprot under each
realization of production cost (ci; cj).
c ;c =
1
1  2

1  
2  
2 
(  c) + (2  
2) 
(2 + ) (1  )
2
c ;c  =
1
1  2

1  
2  
2
(  c+ )2
c;c =
1
1  2

1  
2  
2
(  c)2
c;c  =
1
1  2

1  
2  
2 
(  c)  
(2 + ) (1  )
2
Since (
2 2)
(2+)(1 ) > 1 and  (2+)(1 ) < 0, 8 2 (0; 1), it is evident that c ;c > c ;c 
and c;c > c;c . We therefore obtain c ;c > c ;c  > c;c > c;c .
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Proof of Proposition 1. When there is no information leakage, we can use the proof
of Lemma 1 to obtain the following; i (L;L) = 2c ;c  + 2 (1  )c;c   I, i (N;N) =
2c;c, i (L;N) = 2c ;c + 2 (1  )c;c   I, and i (N;L) = 2c;c  + 2 (1  )c;c.
Therefore, for rm i to deviate from L to N given rm j chooses L, it must be true
that:
i (L;L) i (N;L) < 0 and thus I > 2 (c ;c    c;c ). Let I = 2 (c ;c    c;c ).
Similarly, for rm j to deviate from N to L given rm i chooses N , it must be true
that:
j (N;N)  j (L;N) < 0 and thus I < 2 (c ;c   c;c). Let I = 2 (c ;c   c;c).
These two inequalities must be both satised for the strategy pairs (N , L) & (L, N)
to be the equilibria, i.e., I > I > I. Due to the symmetry of the payo¤ matrix, if I > I,
(N , N) is the Nash equilibrium; and if I < I, the equilibrium strategy pair is (L, L).
Proof of Lemma 2. From intuition, given that share prices are not informative,
the prior of the non-leading rm about the innovation remains unchanged. Were it optimal
for this rm to invest at date 1, it must be better o¤ to invest at the beginning of the
game. It is because, based on the same prior. the strategy L guarantees that a rm does not
lose in product market competition at either date 2 or 3, compared to a possible loss from
competition at date 2 due to a late investment in innovation. Therefore, eF is dominated by
either L or F .
Mathematically, assume rm i leads in innovation investment. Conditioning on Xi =
Xj = 0, the di¤erence in the expected prot between choosing eF andN , c ;c  I c;c .
Therefore rm j choose eF over N when I <  (c ;c    c;c ), i.e., I < 12I.
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Next, given rm i chooses L, for eF to be optimal to rm j there needs to be a protable
deviation from the strategy L. For a given probability of information leakage, j

~F ;L

=
 (c;c  + c ;c ) + 2 (1  )c;c  (1   (1  )) I. To have j (L;L) j

~F ;L

< 0, it
must be I > 
2(1 )I. The conditions I <
1
2
I and I > 
2(1 )I cannot be both satised at
the same time, 8 2 (0; 1),  2 (0; 1). (L, eF ) and ( eF , L) thus cannot be Nash equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, I compute the equilibrium conditions for the strat-
egy pairs (L, F ) and (F , L). Given the probability of information leakage being , the ex-
pected payo¤of rm i choosing F when rm j chooses L, isi (F;L) =  ((2  )c;c  + c ;c )+
2 (1  )c;c I. For (Ai; Aj) = (F;L) to be a Nash equilibrium, it has to be protable for
rm i to deviate from the strategy L to F when rm j chooses L, i.e., i (L;L) i (F;L) < 0.
This leads to I > (2 )
2(1 )I.
Similarly for rm i to deviates from N to F given rm j choosing L, it has to be
i (N;L)   i (F;L) < 0, i.e., I < 12I. Notice that when  > 12 , the inequality (2 )2(1 )I <
I < 1
2
I does not hold. Thus, the strategy (L, F ) cannot be the equilibrium if  > 1
2
.
On the other hand, for F to be an equilibrium strategy it must be protable for rm
j to choose L over N , when expecting rm i to follow when learning good news at date
1. This is true because if the leader rm does not invest at date 0, share prices no longer
contain private information and the other rm cannot act a follower either. We therefore
need j (L; F ) > j (N;N), which gives I <  ((2  )c ;c + c ;c )  2c;c. Let this
expression be ~I.
(L; F ) and (F;L) are the equilibria when all three conditions above are satised, that
is, (2 )
2(1 )I < I < min
n
~I; 1
2
I
o
, 8  1
2
. Note that to ensure the existence of a pure-strategy
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equilibrium, we need ~I > (2 )
2(1 )I, 8 2
 
0; 1
2

and  2 (0; 1). This can be guaranteed with
~I > (2 )
2(1 )I for  =
1
2
, or equivalently with  lower than c+  8 4+(2( 2+)+)
2(2+)(1 ) .
Next, it is similar to compute the equilibrium condition for (L;N) and (N;L). We
already know that rm j deviates from L to N when I > I if rm i chooses L. Also from
the proof of Proposition 1, we know that given I < I rm i chooses L over N when rm i
chooses N . Combining the condition I > 1
2
I for rm j to deviate from F to N , it is evident
that for   1
2
both inequalities are satised when I > I, and for  < 1
2
, I > 1
2
I su¢ ces.
Proposition 1 shows that given rm j choosing N , rm i prefers L to N if I <  I. The
conditions for (L;N) and (N;L) to be equilibria are: I < I < I if  > 1
2
; and 1
2
I < I < I
If   1
2
.
The threshold ~I and I then dene the equilibrium conditions for (N;N). If I > 1
2
I,
(N;N) is the unique equilibrium when I > max

1
2
I; I
	
; and if I  1
2
I, (N;N) is the unique
equilibrium when 1
2
I  I > ~I.
By the same algorithm, for (L, L) to be a Nash equilibrium, we need to ensure when
rm j chooses L and rm i cannot prot from deviating to any other action than L. That
is, I < (2 )
2(1 )I and I < I. Notice that
(2 )
2(1 ) is lower than  when  <
1
2
. Combining
the conditions obtained previously, we know (L, L) is the equilibrium when I < (2 )
2(1 )I for
 < 1
2
, and when I < I for  > 1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 3. The option value of waiting is the di¤erence between
i (F;L) and i (L;L) which is (2  )  (c;c    c ;c ) + (1  ) I.
The rst order derivative of the option value with respect to  and  are respectively,
(2  ) (c;c    c ;c ) I and   2(2 
2)(2 )
(2 )2(1+)(2+) , both negative. Similarly, the rst order
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derivative with respect to I is (1  ) > 0, 8 2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1).
The impact of competition level  on the option value depends on the relative mag-
nitude of @
@
c;c  to @@c ;c . The di¤erence is
2( c)(1 )2(8+2( 6+(4+(7+2))))+2(8+( 2+2)(4+( 1+( 2+(3+)))))2
(4 2)3(1 2) ;
which is positive 8 2 (0; 1).
Proof of Lemma 4. There are two parts in this proof. The rst is to show that it
is optimal for the speculators to submit an order with a xed size 1. Since the noise trader
always submits an order of one unit for each rm, the expected order ow for a listed rm
is zero. The market maker will then quote higher based on a total order ow greater than
zero, or lower otherwise. The speculators would thus either easily expose their identities
by submitting an order with a whole size larger than one, or make lower prot by trading
fractional orders. The optimal way to hide his identity and obtain a favorable quote is to
submit an order of the same size as the one from the noise trader, regardless of the trading
direction.
Next, we consider the trading direction of the speculators. If both rms make an
investment at date 0, both speculators buy if the innovation succeeds and both of them sell
if otherwise. Now consider the case in which only rm i invests at date 0 and learns at
date 1 that its innovation will succeed in reducing its production cost ci. Firm j is then
disadvantaged in price competition for at least one stage. Consequently, speculator i buy
one share of rm i and speculator j submits a sell order of rm j.
On the other hand, if only rm i invests at date 0 but the innovation fails, rm i
incurs a loss I. A failed innovation does not change the price competition in the product
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market, it however lowers the liquidation value of rm i. As a result, speculator i sells. As
for rm j, it will not invest at date 1 when bad news are revealed by the total order ow
(share prices). Neither will it when share prices are not informative, because the strategy
of investing at the intermediate stage without additional information from the stock market
is strictly dominated by the strategy of investing up front.24 Since the market maker is
uninformed when speculatorsorders are hidden in the total order ow, his quote of rm j
must be lower than the actual liquidation value. Consequently, speculator j will submit a
buy order of rm j.
Proof of Lemma 5. The noise trader buys or sells 1 unit of both rmss shares
with equal probability and there is no correlation in their orders across rms. Evidently,
the total order ow of each rm belongs to the set f 2; 0; 2g. Suppose only rm i invests
at date 0 and its innovation succeeds. xi 2 f0; 2g and xj 2 f 2; 0g as a consequence. We
observe immediately that there are four possible combinations of xi and xj, each attached
with the same conditional probability 1
4
. Given that rms innovating activities are pub-
licly observable, the good news of rm i can be inferred by the other agents except when
the order ows of both rms are zero. More specically, when (xi; xj) belongs to the set
f(2; 2) ; (2; 0) ; (0; 2)g, the private information ci = c    is fully revealed by informed
trading. Order ows thus reveal the private information with probability 3
4
conditional on
that the innovation succeeds, thus a total probability 3
4
. Similarly, the probability of re-
vealing the information that the innovation fails is 3
4
(1  ), and 1
4
(1  ) otherwise. Using
24If share prices are not informative at date 1, the non-leading rm has the same prior about the innovation
as before the game starts. Were it optimal for this rm to invest then, it must be better o¤ to invest up-front,
by which it can be assured not to lose in product market competition at either date 2 or 3. The proof of
Lemma 3 formally shows this point.
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the same algorithm, we conclude that the probability of information revelation is the same
for the case where both rms invests at date 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. When both rms choose strategy L, 	(L;L) =  (1  ) (c ;c    c;c).
When rm i chooses to invest at date 0, and rm j is the non-leading rm, we have
	i(L;N) =  (1  ) (c ;c   c;c) and 	j(N;L) =  (1  ) (c;c   c;c ).
	i(Ai; Aj) for each (Ai; Aj) above is concave in  and linear in  and . By taking the
rst order derivative of 	i(Ai; Aj), with respect to , we see that all derivatives are negative
when  > 1
2
and positive otherwise. Similarly, the rst order derivatives of 	i(Ai; Aj) for
each strategy prole is positive respect to both both  and . Similarly, we can compute the
rst order derivative of 	i(L;N) and 	j(N;L) with respect to , and obtain the parameter
region of  in Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 6. This lemma concerns the case where speculator j exits the
stock market while speculator i continues to acquire information and trade in rm i25. The
feasible set of order ow is f 2; 0; 2g for rm i , and f 1; 1g for rm j. So the possible
combinations are f2; 1g, f2; 1g, f0; 1g, and f0; 1g when the innovation is successful,
and f 2; 1g, f+2; 1g, f0; 1g, and f0; 1g when the innovation fails. Evidently, the order
submitted by speculator i is hidden when the set (xi; xj) 2 f(0; 1) ; (0;+1)g, which occurs
with probability 1
2
. The share price Pi is thus informative with probability 12 .
Proof of Proposition 5. Let CStAi;Aj denote the sum of consumer surplus at date
t in the equilibrium where rms choose the action (Ai; Aj), and let cti, p
t
i, and q
t
i denote
the production cost, price and the output for rm i at date t, t = 2; 3. The innovating
25Even without limits of exposure, it can be shown easily that trading only rm is shares is more protable
than trading in both rms which would reveal private information with probability 34 .
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rm will have the production cost c    with probability , or c otherwise. For example,
when (Ai; Aj) = (L;L) and the innovation is successful, product prices and demands can be
computed: p2i;j = p
3
i;j =
(1 )+c 
2  , q
2
j = q
3
j =
 c+
(2 )(1+) .
The total consumer surplus over two stages is, conditional on that the innovation
succeeds, the sum of CS2L;Lj and CS
3
L;Lj, which equals
2( c+)2
(2 )2(1+) . This expression can be
simplied to 2
1 c ;c , using the notation dened in (2::8). Similarly, if the innovation fails,
the consumer surplus over date 2 and 3 is 2( c)
2
(2 )2(1+) , expressed by
2
1 c;c by the notation
in (2::9). The ex-ante expected consumer surplus is therefore 2
1  (c ;c  + (1  )c;c) if
both rms innovate at date 0, and 2
1 c;c if no rm invests.
Using the same method, I compute the expected consumer surplus for the equilibrium
(L;N). CSL;N equals 2CS2L;N j + 2 (1  )CS2L;N j1 , as the surplus will have the same
value at both dates. Similarly, let CSL;F denote the expected consumer surplus for the
equilibrium (L; F ). We know already from Lemma 2 that the non-leading rm will follow
at date 1 only when order ows reveal good news. CSL;F thus consists of two parts; the
expected consumer surplus at date 2, which is equivalent to 1
2
CSL;N , and the surplus CS3L;F
(at date 3). CS3L;F includes
3
4
CSL;Lj when good news being revealed, 34 (1  )CSL;N j1 
when bad news being revealed, and 1
4
CSL;N when order ows reveal no private information.
CSL;N j1  = CSL;Lj1  since the production cost of both rms remains unchanged if the
innovation fails. The expression for CSL;F can then be simplied to 58CSL;N +
3
8
CSL;L. The
di¤erence between CSL;L and CSL;F is thus 58 (CSL;L   CSL;N), which is positive because of
the following.
The sum of consumer surplus over two stages conditioning on the innovation success
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is the sum of CS2L;Lj and CS
3
L;Lj. If innovation succeeds, the total consumer surplus equals
to 2( c+)
2
(2 )2(1+) , which can be expressed by
2
1 c ;c  by using equation (2..8). Similarly,
if the innovation fails, the total consumer surplus over two stages is 2( c)
2
(2 )2(1+) , expressed
by 2
1 c;c by equation (2..9). CSL;L then equals
2
1  (c ;c  + (1  )c;c) if both rms
innovate at date 0.
CSL;L   CSL;N
= 2
1  (c ;c  + (1  )c;c) 
h
2CS2L;N j +
2(1 )
1  c;c
i
= 2

c ;c 
1    CS2L;N j

By using formula (2..1), we can obtain CS2L;N j,
CSt2L;N j = 
2 2c+
(2 )(1+)   
2
2(1 )2(2+)2  
(1 )(2+pipj) (p2i+p2j)+2pipj
1 2 , where pi = c   ,
and pj = c.
c ;c 
1    CS2L;N j = (2( c)(1 )(2+)
2+(4 32 23))
2( 4+2)2(1 2) , which is negative only when  is
su¢ ciently close to 1. Note that when products become very close substitutes, rms will
choose (L;N) & (N;L) in equilibrium and the consumer surplus for (L;L) no longer concerns
us. Therefore, CSL;L is greater than CSL;N . CSL;F is then also greater than CSL;N since
the di¤erence between them is 3
8
(CSL;L   CSL;N).
At last the di¤erence between CSL;N and CSN;N is 2

CS2L;N j   c;c1 

. It can
be simplied to 
(2 )2(1+)

a  c+ (4 3
2)
2(1 )(2+)2

, which is positive. We thus know that
CSL;N > CSN;N .
Proof of Lemma 7. To restrict the analysis to pure strategy equilibrium, I
assume rst that whether speculators acquire information is publicly observable. Next, if
the parameters take values as such all noise traders quit trading and so do the speculators.
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Expecting the exit of speculators, noise traders may however want to return to the market.
To simplify the analysis, I assume the market makers pricing rule to be that he would
consider the orders as being submitted by the speculators and set the prices disadvantageous
to noise traders. I also let the information cost  be trivial here to simplify the analysis,
which however makes speculators strictly prefer not to participate when expecting to earn
zero prot.
In the case where only rm i innovates at date 0, it is easy to see ~	i > 	i > ~	j > 	j
based on the computation of speculatorsexpected prot in Section 2.3 and 2.4. Formula
(2::14) then enables us to conclude that ~ki < k

i <
~kj < k

j .
When both rms nd it optimal to innovate at date 0 with informed trading in stock
market, their strategies stay the same with or without feedback e¤ect. Due to the symmetry
in speculatorstrading prot, either both speculators submit orders of equal size, that is,
ki = k

j = min

1  	i(L;L)

; 1

. Or it occurs that  is so low that both ki and k

j fall to
zero. Consequently no noise trader nds it protable to trade and stock market breaks down.
We go back to the economy in the benchmark case. Firmsoptimal strategy in innovation
remains unchanged, however.
Next, consider the case in which rms equilibrium strategies are a¤ected by the
feedback e¤ect. For the case where rm i leads in innovating and rm j follows at a later
date, it is easy to obtain ki = 1   (1  ) (c ;c c;c) and kj = 1   (1  ) (c;c c;c ),
ki < k

j . If k

i = 0 but k

j > 0, that is, noise traders quit trading rm i and leave speculator j
the monopolist. The expected loss to the noise trader of rm j is thus 2 (1  ) (c;c c;c )
that determines the new threshold for the noise traders of rm j, denoted by ~kj , ~k

j < k

j . If
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 is even lower than 2 (1  ) (c;c   c;c ), i.e., noise traders of rm j would incur a loss
higher than their private benet when speculator j is the monopolist. As a consequence, all
noise traders quit and market breaks down completely.
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CHAPTER 3.
FEEDBACK EFFECTS OF CERTIFICATIONS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS1
3.1 Introduction
The role of certication intermediaries comes in a market with asymmetric information
between buyers and sellers whereas either side cannot credibly disseminate their private
information. These intermediaries are designed to acquire the signals about the privately
informed parties and then to reveal to uninformed parties. Their credibility can be endorsed
by laws and regulations, and/or determined by various mechanisms in di¤erent markets.
Examples of certication intermediaries include auditors, industrial certication systems,
credit rating agencies, and investment banks that evaluate the quality of rms that want
to raise capital. The literature related to certication intermediaries focuses either on their
strategies of information disclosure due to conicts of interests between the users of the
information and the intermediaries2, or on the functionality of certiers as a device for
inspection or signalling3.
In this paper, we look at the informational role of certication agencies in the nancial
markets. As an example, similar to other certiers, a credit rating agency supposedly takes
the role of providing an independent opinion on the credit quality of rms. Moreover, if
ratings contain information, they may alter the expectation of market participants about
the overall quality of a rm. As suggested by empirical studies, credit ratings have either
1THIS IS A JOINT WORK WITH ALEXANDER GUEMBEL.
2See for example Viscusi (1978) Lizzeri (1999), Peyrache and Quesada (2004).
3See for example Fasten and Hofmann (2010), Stahl and Strausz (2011).
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direct or indirect impact on the cost of capital of a borrowing rm4, and they may thus
inuence a rms investment and nancing decisions5. This consequently raises the question
how a certier, such as rating agencies, a¤ects the information production by speculators
in the nancial markets, whose payo¤s are directly related to rmsinvestment decisions.
Being outsiders of a rm, speculators can actively acquire information on rm value and
prot from trading. When the private information possessed by speculators is revealed via
share prices, it may then improve the decision taken by the rm. As a result, by changing
the rms cost of capital and subsequent investment actions, the announcement made by
certication intermediaries inuences speculatorsincentive of information acquisition and
ultimately the total amount of useful information that can help to guide resource allocation.
Despite its importance to market e¢ ciency, the interaction between information production
by certication agencies and private speculators has not been analyzed.
To address the impact of certications on information production in the market, we
build a model that incorporates the feedback e¤ect from the announcement made by a
certier onto investment decisions. A rm has to decide whether to ascertain "in house" the
prospect of a potential investment or to delegate this task to a certier who can credibly
reveal their evaluations to the outsiders. In our model, the di¤erence between delegating
and in-house production only lies in whether this piece of information is publicized by the
certier or remains private to the rm itself. The rm needs to decide, after updating its
belief by using all available information in the market, whether to make the investment.
Under delegation, lenders have access to the certiers evaluation, and hence the information
4See for example Ederington and Goh (1998), Kisgen (2006, 2007) among others.
5See Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006), Manso (2013).
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asymmetry between the rm and lenders is alleviated. So is the adverse selection problem
at the nancing stage. On the other hand, while delegation increases the transparency of a
rms prospects, it may reduce the expected trading gain to the speculators, who now have
less information advantage. As a consequence, speculators may make less e¤ort to acquire
information, which leads to a potential information crowding-out. Less information feeds
back to the rms investment decision. The rm has to trade o¤ between this and a lower
cost of capital at the nancing stage under delegation.
We show in this paper, for some parameter regions, if the rm chooses in-house
information production there is a separating equilibrium at the nancing stage such that
the borrowing cost is higher than under delegation. This is because in-house production
entails more asymmetric information which generates a higher adverse selection discount.
The lenders thus need to set the interest rate at such that the rm can be screened as a
low-type borrower if it indeed receives a bad signal and asks for credit, i.e., the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint of the low type has to be binding. We show that when a priori
it is more likely for the investment to realize a high payo¤ in the future, it is preferable for a
rm to choose delegation except when the prior belief about the investment is very high. The
causes are twofold. Firstly, under the regime of in-house production, a higher prior tightens
the IC constraint of the low type borrower who would be more tempted to mimic, which
consequently pushes up the lending interest rate. In contrast, under the regime of delegation
with the absence of adverse selection problem, a higher prior reduces the interest rate since
it gives a brighter prospect of the investment. This enlarges the di¤erence in the nancing
cost between two regimes. Moreover, with in-house information production, a higher prior
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reduces the variance of payo¤ realizations of the investment and hence speculatorsincentive
of information acquisition, which is again in the opposite direction compared to the regime
of delegation. The crowding-out e¤ect thus becomes less severe, and the rm more likely
chooses to delegate.
We also show that if the quality of the private information to be acquired by the
rm or the certier is su¢ ciently high, the rm more likely chooses not to delegate. If
the signal obtained and kept private by the rm predicts better the state of the world, the
rent from mimicking is lower and thus the IC constraint of the low type borrower is less
tight. The interest demanded by the lenders falls consequently, which increases the payo¤
variance and thus the information acquired by speculators under in-house production. As a
comparison, when the information prevailing in the market is more precise under delegation,
it becomes less valuable for speculators to acquire additional information, which thus reduces
price informativeness in the stock market. As a consequence, when the rm expects to get
a private signal with high precision, the advantage of delegation in having a lower nancing
cost is reduced while information crowding-out becomes more severe and dominant. In that
case, the rm more likely chooses not to reveal its private signal through delegation. Using a
similar reasoning, we show in addition that the rm prefers not to delegate when there is an
increase in the expected payo¤ of the rms current assets in place without new investment.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on the link between stock market e¢ -
ciency and its impact on the real economy. More specically, we use the feedback mechanism
based on the extended theory on e¢ cient market hypothesis. The crucial assumption un-
derlying our model is that stock prices are e¢ cient not only in reecting the available infor-
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mation regarding the future cash ows, but also in aggregating private information explored
by outside investors and being used to improve corporate decisions and resource allocation
(Dow and Gorton, 1997). (See also Bond, Edmans and Goldstein (2012) for a survey on this
active informational role of prices.) Empirical studies nd strong evidence that rms use the
information contained in stock prices when making decisions on corporate disclosure, cash
savings, investment and takeovers6.
Our paper also contributes to a better understanding of certication intermediaries in
nancial markets, which include investment bank, brokers, monitoring institutions, as well as
credit rating agencies7. Our model relies on an assumption commonly used in this research
area that certications in the nancial market are informative to outsiders of a rm including
capital providers and traders in the nancial markets. Unlike the existing literature, however,
we do not focus on the mechanisms used by these agencies in supplying information under
various constraints and incentive schemes. It is also worth mentioning that the rm in our
model makes the choice of delegation before knowing its type and thus does not use the
certication as a signaling device for the outsiders. This aspect also di¤erentiates our paper
from the previous work on certications.
When relating these two strands of literature, it is natural for one to wonder about
the link between certications and information e¢ ciency in the stock market. The potential
feedback e¤ect of certications is overlooked in previous work on certication intermediaries
6See for instance Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007), Bakke and Whited (2010), Edmans, Goldstein and
Jiang (2012), Foucault and Fresard (2012), Fresard (2012), Zuo (2013) among others.
7There is a large body of literature on this subject. See for example Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984),
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) among
many others.
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in nancial markets. There are two exceptions. Manso (2013) incorporates in his model
the feedback from credit ratings to rmsoptimal default decisions and focuses on welfare
analysis under di¤erent rating policies. Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) consider a
situation in which some investors base their decisions on the announcements of credit rating
agencies and consequently ratings have a real impact on the rms choice between a risky
and a safe project. While under a similar feedback mechanism, the signal acquired by the
certication agency in our paper is not more informative than the signal acquired by the rm
itself. We thus do not study the actual level of information content in the certication or the
disclosure policies of the certier. Instead, we investigate the impact of such a certication
on the strategies of other informed outsiders in the stock market, and further study how
that impact feeds back to rmsex ante decision of committing itself to the certier through
delegation.
The model in our paper is related to Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994) who illus-
trate in a di¤erent context a crowding-out e¤ect on information production. These authors
consider the competition in trading between informed outsiders in the stock market and the
managers (insiders) when being allowed to trade, the result of which a¤ects the information
production by the outsiders. Similarly to ours, managers in their model allocate resources
based on both their own information and outside information that is revealed through share
prices. These authors show that when managers are allowed to trade, it becomes more
likely that order ows reveal the state of the world, which reduces outsiderstrading prot.
Consequently, outsiders have lower incentive to improve the quality of their information ac-
quisition. In the meanwhile the rm may benet from a higher initial o¤er price paid by
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liquidity traders, who expect to bear a smaller trading loss against informed traders. Di¤er-
ent from Khanna et al (1994), our paper do not model the competition in the trading game
between informed traders inside and outside of the rm. If a rm chooses to delegate, it
commits itself to supply the "insider" information to the outsiders in a credible way.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the setup of the model. Firms
investment strategies are computed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the delegation choice
of the rm. Section 3.5 includes an extension and Section 3.6 concludes. Proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
The timeline There are four dates. At date 0, a rm faces an uncertainty about the payo¤ of
a project that requires a certain amount of investment. At the same date, the rm decides
whether to delegate to an outside agency the task of acquiring additional information about
the project. At date 1, a private signal can be obtained by either the outside agency or the
rm itself, depending on the delegation choice. If the rm chooses delegation, the outside
agency is going to publicize this signal at the same date. At date 2, speculators in the
stock market can acquire a costly private signal regarding the rms project. The stock
market opens. Both speculators and noise traders submit orders to a market maker who
sets the trading price. After observing the order ow in the stock market, the rm makes
the investment decision and the credit market decides the interest rate if the rm asks for
credit. At the nal date (date 3), the payo¤ of the project is realized.
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Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 Date 3
Stock market
trading occurs;
Investment
decision is taken.
The firm
decides
whether to
delegate.
Private signal is
obtained either by
the firm or by the
certification
agency under
delegation.
Investment
payoff is
realized.
Figure 3..1: The Timeline
The rms choices and payo¤s A rm is currently operating a project with an uncertain
future payo¤. The nal payo¤ of this project depends on both the rms action A at this
point and a state of the world !. If the rm decides to continue investing in the project, it
needs to nance I, and this action is denoted by C. The rm can also choose an action S,
which is to stop investing and maintain the status quo. Depending on the state of the world
! which takes a value from f0; 1g, each action in fC; Sg will lead to a di¤erent set of payo¤
realizations. ! is assumed to be distributed between the state 1 and 0 with probabilities 
and 1  , respectively. The distribution of ! is independent from the action A.
We use the notation V !A for the payo¤ of the project. If the rm chooses C, the payo¤
is V 1c if ! = 1 and V
0
c otherwise. The payo¤ realizations of the assets in place, when the
rm chooses S, are denoted by V 1s and V
0
s for ! = 1 or 0, respectively. We assume that
V 1c > V
0
c , V
1
s > V
0
s , and in addition the variance of the payo¤ is higher under the action to
continue investing, i.e., V 1c   V 0c > V 1s   V 0s . We also assume that the optimal action for the
rm in a world with perfect information is to invest if ! = 1 and to stop if otherwise, i.e.,
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V 1c   I > V 1s and V 0c < I + V 0s .
Financing problem Assume that the rm can only choose debt nancing from a competitive
credit market, and lenders demand an interest rate R based on their belief of !. Creditors
do not possess any private information about ! and therefore have the same prior as the
rm at date 0. We assume that creditors do not actively search for information on their
own, but they can update their belief if additional information is produced and revealed by
other agents. Let us now use  to denote the posterior belief of the creditors as well as other
agents who only have access to public information.
Consider that the rm chooses C and obtains I from lenders at a gross interest rate
R. The rm will pay back IR to lenders if the state of the world is high (! = 1). If the state
of the world is low (! = 0), the rm will have to default and pay only V 0c and be left with
zero payo¤ as it is protected by the limited liability. This assumption then implies V 0c < I.
Let the risk free interest rate be normalized to zero. The minimum value of R is hence 1.
The participation constraint of creditors then follows,
IR + (1  )V 0c  I: (PC1)
When this constraint is binding, lenders are assured to break even from lending I at the
interest rate ~R,
~R =
1
I
 
I   (1  )V 0c

: (3..1)
On the other hand, whether the rm chooses to continue the project depends on whether
its own participation constraint is satised for a given interest rate R, that is,

 
V 1c   IR
  V 1s + (1  )V 0s : (PC2)
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Private information There may be two sources of additional information about the realization
of !. The rst one may come from an in-house information production conducted by the
rm itself, which will generate a private signal z, z 2 f0; 1g. The precision of this signal,
denoted by , is dened as  = Pr (z = !). We assume that the signal z is informative but
never perfect, and thus  2  1
2
; 1

. The precision  is exogenously given and publicly known.
The rm can update its belief based on z and take the decision on whether to continue the
project.
The same source of information (signal z) may also be obtained if the rm delegates
information acquisition to a certication agency. The agency assesses the prospect of the
project and reveals their signal to the public. To simply the analysis and to focus on the
di¤erence that is subject only to the delegation choice itself, we assume that the quality of
signal z is una¤ected by delegation. In other words, the signal received by the agency has
the same precision  as the one received by the rm under in-house information production.
This assumption also makes the point that the certication agency cannot acquire better or
more information regarding the investment project than the rm itself. The di¤erence only
lies in whether z is publicized by the outside agency or remains private to the rm itself.
We also assume that the cost incurred by the rm to obtain z is the same whether or not to
delegate, which is thus neglected in the model for simplication. In addition, the rm is not
obliged to delegate if it prefers otherwise.
The second source of information regarding ! may come from informed trading in the
stock market. Let us rst put down the assumptions. There are three types of agents in the
stock market. First of all, there exist a continuum of speculators of measure one, who are
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risk neutral. Each of them can acquire a private signal s about ! after exerting an e¤ort
. Similarly as z, the precision of s is dened as Pr (s = !). We match the precision of s
with the e¤ort level  chosen by each speculator, i.e.,  = Pr (s = !). We assume that each
speculator can buy or sell only one unit of share due to some exogenous wealth constraints.
Given that all the speculators are identical apart from each receiving an independent signal
s, they share the same cost function of exerting e¤ort and therefore choose the same  in
equilibrium. The information cost, c (), is dened by the following,
c () = 

  1
2
2
(3..2)
where  > 0. We restrict our attention to the scenario where  is su¢ ciently large such that
the signal s is informative but never perfect. In other words, each speculator chooses  from
the open interval
 
1
2
; 1

. In the meanwhile, there also exist noise traders in the stock market
who trade an aggregate quantity y that follows a uniform distribution, y  U ( 1; 1). Finally
there is a competitive market maker who provides liquidity by trading against speculators
and noise traders. The market maker sets the share price at his rational expectation of the
rms payo¤ based on the total order ow, and he earns zero prot in expectation.
Based on these assumptions, we can now look at the information production in the
stock market. Let x denote the aggregate size of the orders submitted by the speculators.
Suppose the true state of the world is 1, each speculator has a probability  to obtain a signal
s = 1. By the law of large numbers, there will be a fraction  of speculators who obtain a
correct signal and submit a buying order, and also a fraction (1  ) who obtain a wrong
signal and submit a selling order. The aggregate order size is therefore 2 1. Similarly, the
speculators submit orders with an aggregate size x = 1  2 conditional on that the state !
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is 0.
Let X denote the total order ow, X = x+ y. X thus follows the distribution below,
X 
8>><>>:
U (2  2; 2) ; if ! = 1
U ( 2; 2  2) ; if ! = 0
(3..3)
of which the density is 1
2
, 8!. Given that  2  1
2
; 1

, we know that  2 < 2 2 < 2 2 <
2. When being between 2  2 and 2  2, the total order ow X is not informative, which
occurs with the following probability,
Pr (X 2 (2  2; 2  2)) =
Z 2 2
2 2
1
2
dX = 2  2. (3..4)
This probability stays the same for ! being either 1 or 0, since the aggregate size of noise
tradersorders is symmetrically distributed around zero. When X is higher than 2   2
(or lower than 2   2), X reveals perfectly that ! is high (or low), which occurs with the
complementary probability 2   1. The speculators can therefore prot from trading with
a probability 2   2. As a consequence, the probability that the order ow is informative
is endogenized by speculatorschoice of  in equilibrium. The more e¤ort the speculators
exert in information acquisition, the more precise their signals are, and the more likely the
share price perfectly reveals the value of ! to the rm and other agents.
To summarize, the rm can learn about ! from the signal z which is acquired either
privately on its own or by the certication agency under delegation. Besides, the rm may
also benet from the information production in the stock market.
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3.3 Investment Decisions Under Two Regimes
Regime 1: To delegate, z is publicizedWhen the signal z is going to be revealed by the agency
under delegation, there is no asymmetric information between the rm and the lenders. The
posterior belief  is therefore a function of z and also the order ow X. Remember that when
X is informative, agents learn perfectly about ! and thus  = !. The investment problem
is solved naturally. That is, if X > 2  2 and thus  = 1, the rm chooses C (to continue
investing), borrows at a zero interest rate, and realizes a payo¤ (V 1c   I). Or if X is below
2  2 and reveals ! = 0, the rm chooses S (to stop) and obtains V 0s .
We therefore only need to look at the situation when X is not informative, i.e., when
X 2 (2  2; 2  2). In this case, the interest rate R required by the lenders is determined
by the binding constraint (PC1), and is hence equal to ~R as dened in (3..1). We thereafter
denote the interest rates that are conditional on the publicized signal z by Rz=1 and Rz=0,
respectively. Similarly, the posterior belief conditioning on z = 1 and z = 0 are denoted
respectively by 1 and 0. We can obtain 1 and 0 by Bayesian updating,
1 =

 + (1  ) (1  ) (3..5)
0 =
 (1  )
 (1  ) + (1  )  (3..6)
It is easy to show that 1 > 0 and hence Rz=1 < Rz=0.
Substituting Rz=1 and Rz=0 to the rms participation constraint (PC2), we can
obtain the conditions for the investment decision, that is, the rm chooses C when
 > 1  (I   V
0
c + V
0
s ) (1  )
(I   V 0c + V 0s ) (1  ) + (V 1c   V 1s   I) 
; if z = 1; (3..7)
 < 0  (V
1
c   V 1s   I) 
(I   V 0c + V 0s ) (1  ) + (V 1c   V 1s   I) 
; if z = 0: (3..8)
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(3..7) and (3..8) give the expressions for the thresholds of  conditioning on z, namely,
1 and 0. To simplify the notation, let C and S denote the rms expected payo¤ from
choosing C and S based on the prior belief ,
C = V
1
c + (1  )V 0c (3..9)
S = V
1
s + (1  )V 0s (3..10)
Notice that 1 and 0 are the same when the required investment I equals C   S. Using
these notations, we can write down the investment decisions under the regime of delegation,
when the order ow does not reveal !.
Lemma 8 When the order ow is not informative, the rm takes the investment decision
under regime 1 as follows.
(i). Given I  C   S (i.e., 1 < 12 < 0), the rm chooses C 8z, if  2
 
1
2
; 0

;
and the rm chooses C only when z = 1, if  2 (0; 1).
(ii). Given I > C   S (i.e., 0 < 12 < 1), the rm chooses S 8z, if  2
 
1
2
; 1

,
and the rm chooses C only when z = 1, if  2 (1; 1).
The lenders ask for an interest Rz=1 or Rz=0, depending on the publicized signal z.
Regime 2: In-house information production Under the second regime, the rm chooses not to
delegate and therefore acquires the signal z by itself. Since the rm cannot creditably reveal
its signal, z remains private in this case. This leads to information asymmetry between the
lenders and the rm. To facilitate the illustration, we thereafter call the rm as a type 1
borrower if z = 1 and a type 0 borrower otherwise. After receiving the signal z, the rm
becomes aware of its type, and it may learn more about ! from the order ow at the next
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date when the stock market opens and trading orders are submitted. Remember that the
uncertainty on ! is resolved completely if the order ow reveals the state of the world. If the
order ow is not informative and the rm decides to invest, it then goes to the lenders for
raising the required capital. We assume that there are many lenders in a competitive credit
market. The rm is going to borrow from whoever o¤ers the lowest interest rate.
Under Regime 2, the lenders cannot distinguish a type 1 borrower from a type 0,
and consequently they chooses an interest rate to rst satisfy the following participation
constraint,
Pr (z = 1)
 
1IR +
 
1  1V 0c + Pr (z = 0)  0IR +  1  0V 0c   I: (PC3)
Let R denote the interest rate for PC3 to be binding,
R =
I   (1  )V 0c
I
: (3..11)
When a pooling equilibrium at the rate R is not feasible, the interest rate is then chosen
to screen the type 0 borrower such that the following incentive compatibility constraint is
satised,
0
 
V 1c   IR
  0V 1s +  1  0V 0s : (IC)
By binding the IC constraint, we obtain the interest rate, RIC , that can prevent the type 0
borrower from mimicking the type 1 and borrowing,
RIC =
1
I

V 1c   V 1s  
1  0
0
V 0s

: (3..12)
Lemma 9 A type 1 borrower is always willing to borrow at the interest rate RIC.
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The following lemma states the interest rate demanded by the lenders when the order
ow is not informative under the second regime.
Lemma 10 If the order ow is not informative under the regime of in-house information
production, and if Rz=1 < R < Rz=0  RIC, the lenders demand an interest rate at R to
attract both type 1 and type 0 borrower;
If Rz=1 < R < RIC  Rz=0, the lenders demand R;
If Rz=1 < RIC  R < Rz=0, the lenders demand RIC to screen the type 0 borrower;
And if RIC  Rz=1 < R < Rz=0, the lenders demand Rz=1 to attract only the type 1
borrower.
Once we know how the interest rate is decided in the credit market, we can now check
the investment decision under Regime 2 when the order ow is not informative. Based on
Lemma 10, Lemma 11 follows immediately.
Lemma 11 When the order ow is not informative, the rm takes the following investment
decisions under Regime 2:
(i). Given I  C   S (i.e., 1 < 12 < 0), if  2
 
1
2
; 
0
the rm always chooses C,
and lenders ask for the interest rate R; if  2  0 ; 1, the rm chooses C only when z = 1
and it borrows either at RIC 8 2
 

0
; 
00
or at Rz=1 8 2
 

00
; 1

;
(ii). Given I > C   S (i.e., 0 < 12 < 1), if  2

1
2
; 
1

the rm always chooses S
, and lenders set the interest rate to Rz=0 to exclude the borrower of both types; if  2 (1; 1),
the rm chooses C only when z = 1 and it borrows either at RIC 8 2
 
1; 
00
or at Rz=1
8 2  00 ; 1;
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where 1 and 0 are dened in (3..7) and (3..8), 
0
and 
00
are the threshold values
for  at which RIC = R and RIC = Rz=1, respectively, 
00
> 
0
> 0.
Comparing Lemma 11 to Lemma 8, we can see the di¤erences between two regimes
in both the rms action and the interest rate set by the lenders, which shows the rst e¤ect
due to delegation. Note that when  is either su¢ ciently high, i.e.,  2  00 ; 1, the rm has
exactly the same strategy and nancing cost under two regimes. Similarly the rm always
chooses S when the required investment is very high (I > C   S) and  2

1
2
; 
1

.
Remember that choosing delegation or not does not a¤ect the acquisition of the
private signal z, but changes whether z is publicly known. When the rm commits itself to
a credible disclosure via delegation, it eliminates the information asymmetry between the
rm and the lenders. The nancing cost falls and the participation constraint of the rm is
relaxed. This is particularly true in the case in which the rm has the same strategy under
two regimes but bears a higher nancing cost (RIC) under in-house information production
than under delegation (the interest rate being Rz=1)8.
The reduced information asymmetry under delegation then leads to changes in the
optimal e¤ort level (the precision of the signal s) chosen by speculators. The intuition is
that speculators incentive to acquire information is not only a¤ected by the variance of
the payo¤ realizations related to the equilibrium investment decision, but also driven by
their information advantage relative to the other outside agents. The more uncertainty the
outsiders have about the state of the world !, the higher e¤ort is chosen by speculators.
8This occurs, as shown by Lemma 11, when  2


0
; 
00

if I  C   S and when  2


1
; 
00

if
I > C   S .
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Delegation may therefore induce a crowding-out e¤ect of information production in the
nancial market, which reduces the probability of the stock price being informative. Being
less likely perfectly informed about the prospect of the investment, the rm may generate a
lower payo¤.
To see more clearly the trade-o¤ between these two e¤ects, we thereafter focus our
analysis of the rms delegation choice in the parameter region where a separating equilibrium
arises with RIC at the nancing stage, as dened by Lemma 11. Compared to the same
parameter region under in-house information acquisition, there is no distortion of investment
decision but a higher nancing cost for the rm when z = 1 and the order ow is not
informative. A quick discussion for the case with both distortion of investment decision and
borrowing cost (i.e., I  C   S and  2
 
0; 
0
) is presented in the extension.
3.4 Delegation choice
After computing the rms investment strategies under two regimes, we are interested
in knowing when it is preferable for the rm to choose delegation. Under regime 1, z is public
information and therefore the e¤ort choice of speculators is conditional on z. Remember
that the cost function of speculators, dened in (3..2), is convex in the e¤ort choice ,
and speculators may prot from trading with a probability (2  2). The expected trading
prot, netted out the e¤ort cost, is thus a concave function of . By deriving the rst
order condition, we can obtain the optimal e¤ort choice for z = 1 and 0, which are denoted
respectively by c;z=1 and 

s;z=0. All the speculators, being identical ex ante, choose the
same e¤ort level in equilibrium. The subscripts of  indicate the action taken by the rm
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when the order ow is not informative, for a given signal z.
Lemma 12 Under the regime of delegation, 8 2  max1; 0	 ; 00, speculators choose
the following e¤ort level based on the publicized signal z,
c;z=1 =
1
2
+
21
 
1  1 (V 1c   IRz=1)
 + 41
 
1  1 (V 1c   IRz=1) (3..13)
s;z=0=
1
2
+
20
 
1  0 (V 1s   V 0s )
 + 40
 
1  0 (V 1s   V 0s ) : (3..14)
Using c;z=1 and 

s;z=0, we can then obtain the rms payo¤. Let d denote the
expected payo¤ the rm by choosing delegation. d is composed of the conditional payo¤s
d;z=1 and d;z=0, respectively, for z = 1 and z = 0. Remember that the order ow is
not informative with probability 2  2c;z=1, and it is perfectly informative with probability
2c;z=1   1. The same logic applies when z = 0. We thus have d;z=1 and d;z=0 as follows,
d;z=1=
 
2  2c;z=1

1
 
V 1c   IRz=1

+
 
2c;z=1   1
 
1
 
V 1c   I

+
 
1  1V 0s  (3..15)
d;z=0=
 
2  2s;z=0
 
0V 1s +
 
1  0V 0s +  2s;z=0   1 0  V 1c   I+  1  0V 0s 
(3..16)
The ex ante expected payo¤ under delegation, d, is thus,
d=Pr (z = 1)d;z=1+Pr (z = 0)d;z=0 (3..17)
Under the regime of in-house information production, a speculators expected trading
prot and thus his e¤ort level in equilibrium is no longer conditional on z. For the case in
which the rm chooses C only when z = 1 and paysRIC when the order ow is uninformative,
the equilibrium e¤ort choice RIC is dened in Lemma 13.
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Lemma 13 Under the regime of in-house information production, 8 2  max1; 0	 ; 00,
speculators exert e¤ort RIC in equilibrium,
RIC =
1
2
+
2 (1  ) [ (V 1c   IRIC   V 0s ) + (1  )V 1s ]
 + 4 (1  ) [ (V 1c   IRIC   V 0s ) + (1  )V 1s ]
(3..18)
Using Lemma 13, we can write down the expected payo¤ of the rm, denoted by ,
 =
 
2  2RIC
 

 
V 1c   IRIC

+ (1  ) V 1s +  (1  )V 0s

+
 
2RIC   1
 

 
V 1c   I

+ (1  )V 0s

: (3..19)
By comparing (3..17) and (3..19), we observe that delegation changes not only the
payo¤ of investment conditioning on !, but also the amount of information production in
the stock market () that is determined by the variance of payo¤ realizations for a given
investment strategy, as shown by (3..13), (3..14) and (3..18). Therefore,  is a¤ected by
speculatorsbelief after observing z (i.e., 1 or 0) under delegation, or  when the rm
chooses not to delegate. The posterior belief may further a¤ect  through changing the
payo¤ of the investment conditioning on ! = 1 (i.e., V 1c   IR with R being the lending
rate in equilibrium). To better understand when and why a rm wants to delegate, we are
going to examine how the rms choice is a¤ected by the changes in parameter values. We
focus on the impact of the prior , the precision  of the signal z, the payo¤ realization V 1s .
 a¤ects the prospect of the investment,  may be interpreted as the di¢ culty in assessing
a project value, and V 1s may be interpreted as the prospect of the current assets in place.
To simplify the derivation and to disentangle the e¤ect of each force, we impose separately
some simplications on V 1s , V
0
s and .
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The impact of the prior belief  The size of  determines the ex-ante likelihood of the project
being at a good state of the world (i.e., a better project). In order to focus on the impact of ,
we now assume V 1s = V
0
s = Vs while all other assumptions remain unchanged. Consequently,
speculatorsoptimization problem becomes trivial if they anticipate the rm to choose S
when the order ow is not informative, as speculators do not exert e¤ort given there is no
uncertainty in the nal payo¤ related to S, i.e., s;z=0 =
1
2
.
Under the regime of delegation, an increase in  rst increases the posterior 1 and thus
pushes down the interest rate Rz=1. This leads to a higher conditional payo¤ (V 1c   IRz=1)
when z = 1 and the order ow uninformative, which consequently increases the incentive of
information acquisition. If however 1 becomes closer to 1, the reduced uncertainty decreases
the payo¤ variance and thus has an opposite e¤ect on c;z=1. The negative e¤ect dominates
when  becomes su¢ ciently large.
Similarly, an increase in  has two e¤ects on RIC . It rst leads to a higher posterior
of the type 0 borrower who then has more incentive to mimic the type 1. As a result, the
IC constraint is tightened, and lenders demand a higher lending rate RIC . A lower payo¤
(V 1c   IRIC) reduces the incentives of speculators to acquire information, and thus leads to
a smaller  in equilibrium. On the other hand,  also a¤ects the ex ante uncertainty about
!. The closer  is getting towards 1
2
, a higher incentive speculators have for information
acquisition. We can show that the negative e¤ect always dominates. Lemma 14 thus follows
Lemma 14 Under the regime of in-house information production, RIC decreases in the
prior belief , 8 2 (0; 1);
Under the regime of delegation, speculatorse¤ort level c;z=1 increases in the prior be-
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lief , 8 2

0;
(I 2V 0c +V 1c )(1 )
V 1c  V 0c  (2 1)(I V 0c )

, and c;z=1 decreases in , 8 2

(I 2V 0c +V 1c )(1 )
V 1c  V 0c  (2 1)(I V 0c ) ; 1

.
In other words, except when  is su¢ ciently high, an increase in  reduces the amount
of information production under regime 2, compared to regime 1. The crowding-out e¤ect
becomes less signicant in this case.
On the other hand,  a¤ects also the rms conditional payo¤ when the investment
takes place. An increase of  decreases Rz=1 as it increases the posterior 
1 under delegation.
RIC however increases in  since the incentive compatibility constraint is tightened for the
type 0 borrower. This means that the cost advantage at the nancing stage becomes more
signicant under delegation when  increases. Using the results from Lemma 14, we can
obtain Proposition 6 as below.
Proposition 6 An increasing prior belief  makes it more likely that the advantage of
having a low nancing cost dominates the crowding-out e¤ect of information production,
except when  gets close to 1, and thus it is more likely that the rm wants to delegate the
information production.
The impact of  Next, let us look at the impact of , that is, the quality of the signal obtained
by either the rm or the certication agency. This is of interest because the precision of
signal  a¤ects both information production and the conditional payo¤s of the rm through
changing the belief updating of the speculators as well as the lenders. In addition, the level
of  is relevant in practice, since it can be related to the complexity of the investment which
a¤ects the di¢ culty and the result of information acquisition.9
9It may be also related to the level of internal corporate governance. When the internal governance is
more e¤ective, managers work more e¢ ciently in evaluating a future project and it is also easier for an
outside agency to obtain information and to fully understand a rms protability concerning an investment.
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In order to restrict attention and simplify the analysis, we keep the assumption V 1s =
V 0s = Vs and thus 

s;z=0 =
1
2
. In addition, we assume  = 1
2
, that is, a priori the state of the
world ! takes the value 1 or 0 with equal probabilities. This assumption simplies 1 to 
and 0 to (1  ). The expressions of the optimal  can then be simplied,
c;z=1 =
1
2
+
2 (1  ) (V 1c   IRz=1)
 + 4 (1  ) (V 1c   IRz=1)
(3..20)
RIC =
1
2
+
[ (V 1c   IRIC   Vs) + (1  )Vs]
2 [ +  (V 1c   IRIC   Vs) + (1  )Vs]
(3..21)
where Rz=1 = 1I (I   (1  )V 0c ), RIC = 1I

V 1c   11 Vs

. The comparative statics with
respect to  is stated in Lemma 15.
Lemma 15 Under the regime of delegation, speculatorse¤ort level c;z=1 increases in the
precision level  of the signal z, 8 2

1
2
; V
1
c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c )

, and c;z=1 decreases in , 8 2
V 1c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c ) ; 1

;
Under the regime of in-house information production, RIC increases , 8 2
 
1
2
; 1

.
The intuition is as follows. When the signal z becomes more precise, the posterior 1
increases for z = 1, and thus the interest rate Rz=1 is lowered. Consequently, the conditional
payo¤ V 1c   IRz=1 increases in , which increases speculatorsoptimal e¤ort level c;z=1.
Meanwhile, a higher  reduces the uncertainty about ! when z is revealed under delegation,
which then reduces the information advantage of speculators and thus their e¤ort level c;z=1.
If  is su¢ ciently large, the negative e¤ect dominates and c;z=1 decreases in . Similarly, an
increase of  has two e¤ects on RIC . On the one hand, it loosens the incentive compatibility
constraint of the type 0 borrower and thus lowers the interested rate RIC . This has a positive
impact on RIC , due to a higher variance of investment payo¤. On the other hand, an increase
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of  pushes up the expected rm value and thus the market price when the order ow is not
informative, which a¤ects RIC negatively. This e¤ect is however dominated by the positive
one (when  = 1
2
), and therefore RIC increases in . As a result, with  being su¢ ciently
high (i.e.,  2

V 1c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c ) ; 1

), the more precise the signal z is expected to be, the more
signicant the crowding-out e¤ect would be on information production under delegation.
The disadvantage from having a higher nancing cost becomes less signicant due to the
inverse relationship between  and RIC . We can therefore conclude in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 When the quality of the signal z is su¢ ciently high, the crowding-out of
information production becomes more severe, compared to the loss due to the higher nancing
cost. As a result, the rm more likely chooses the in-house information acquisition.
The impact of V 1s At last, we want to understand how the prospect of the rms current assets
in place a¤ects the delegation choice. Let us denote V 0s as V
1
s    and focus on the expected
payo¤ of the strategy S by varying the value of V 1s . Note that we keep the assumption that
ex ante the state of the world ! can be high or low with equal probabilities (i.e.,  = 1
2
).
Under the regime of delegation, an increase in V 1s does not change the variance of
the payo¤ realizations either when z is revealed to be 0 and the rm chooses S or when
z = 1 and the rm chooses C. As a result, s;z=0 and 

c;z=1 are not a¤ected. A higher
V 1s however relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of the type 0 borrower, and thus
decreases the interest rate RIC demanded in equilibrium. This would then increases the
variance of payo¤s associated with the action C under the regime of in-house information
production. Speculatorsincentive of information acquisition is thus higher and so is RIC .
The crowding-out e¤ect on information production becomes more severe, and in the mean-
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while the disadvantage at the nancing stage is less signicant. We can thus conclude in
Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 When the assets in place have a higher expected payo¤, it is preferable for
the rm to choose the regime of in-house information production.
3.5 Extension
In the previous section, we examine in isolation the case in which the rms investment
decision remains unchanged (its action A depends on the signal z) whether or not z is public
while the nancing cost di¤ers between two regimes. It is worth mentioning that the changes
of parameter values may shift the equilibrium from one to another. The equilibrium with
an adjacent parameter region is that, under delegation, the rm invests only when z = 1
at the interest rate Rz=1, versus the rm invests regardless of z and borrows at R under
in-house information production. We know from Lemma 11 that, under the regime of in-
house production, the equilibrium at the nancing stage is shifted from a separating one to
a pooling equilibrium when I  C   S and  falls below 0 such that RIC > R.
To understand whether the results in the previous section may be altered when
changes in the parameter values changes the equilibrium at the nancing stage, we rst com-
pute the e¤ort choice of speculators, denoted by R, in the parameter region with RIC > R.
Lemma 16 When z remains private in the regime of in-house information production, if
I  C   S and 0 <  < 0, speculators choose the following e¤ort level,
R =
1
2
+
2 (1  )  V 1c   I R
 + 4 (1  )  V 1c   I R :
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Speculators choose, under the regime of delegation, c;z=1 and 

s;z=0 that are dened
by (3..13) and (3..14) in Lemma 12.
First of all, R is not a¤ected by any change in  since the signal z is hidden and
speculatorse¤ort choice is independent from . Neither is the rms expected payo¤ as
the rm always chooses to invest as long as the order ow is not informative. Based on
Lemma 15, we know that the c;z=1 decreases in  when  >
V 1c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c ) (for  =
1
2
), and
therefore in this region the information production by speculators is reduced when the rm
chooses delegation compared to otherwise. As a consequence, when  is below the threshold
V 1c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c ) , an increase in  makes it preferable for the rm to choose delegation. Combining
with Proposition 7, we observe that, for  at a relatively low level, the rm more likely
prefers to delegate and to borrows at Rz=1, when  takes a higher value. When  continues
to increase and reaches the threshold V
1
c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c ) , the rm may switch its preference to the
regime of in-house information production, under which the equilibrium at the nancing
stage changes from pooling to separating, that is, the rm invests when z = 1 and borrows
at RIC given the order ow is uninformative.
Secondly, an increase of V 1s may shift the equilibrium at the nancing stage, under
in-house information production, from pooling at R to separating with RIC , as an increase
of V 1s reduces RIC but does not a¤ect R. Notice that both 

R and 

z=1 are not a¤ected
by V 1s , an increase of V
1
s has a bigger positive impact on the conditional payo¤ of the rm
under delegation. This is because that under delegation, the rm chooses S not only when
the order ow reveals the state of the world to be low but also when the certication agency
reveals z = 0. The rms payo¤ is thus more often associated with strategy S. Combining
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Proposition 8, we see that when V 1s is relatively low, an increase in V
1
s makes it more likely
that the rm should choose delegation. When V 1s is su¢ ciently high such that the rm would
borrow at RIC (i.e., RIC < R) if the signal z is hidden, the rm may switch from the regime
of delegation to the regime of in-house production.
Finally, it is easy to show that RIC   R moves in the same direction as the prior
belief , and hence an increasing  may shift the equilibrium from separating to pooling in
the regime of in-house production. For the pooling equilibrium with the interest rate R, 
a¤ects R positively via reducing the interest rate R and thus pushing up the payo¤variance
of the investment. On the other hand, depending on whether  is above 1
2
, a change in 
a¤ects the level of uncertainty about !, which consequently inuences speculatorsincentive
of information acquisition. When two e¤ects combined, R increases in  for  <
V 1c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c ) ,
and vice versa. For  relatively small, the rm would borrow at RIC at the separating
equilibrium under the regime of in-house production. Combining Lemma 14, we know an
increasing  alleviates the crowding out of information production, and hence the rm may
prefer to delegate, which is consistent with Proposition 6. When  reaches a certain threshold
such that RIC > R and the rm would be in the pooling equilibrium at R if z is kept private,
the crowding-out e¤ect increases with a higher prior . In this case, the rms preference is
ambiguous, however.
3.6 Conclusion
We study in this paper the impact of certications on information production in
nancial market and how it feeds back to investment decisions. We build a model in which
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a rm needs to take decisions on a potential investment that requires new capital from the
credit market. The rm can choose to acquire additional information in order to ascertain
the investment prospect and keep that private. If however the rm decides to commit itself to
credible disclosures in order to alleviate the adverse selection problem at the nancing stage,
it can delegate the information production to a certication agency that disseminates their
evaluations to the public. While reducing the nancing cost, delegation may nevertheless
crowd out private information that could be acquired by speculators and reduce information
e¢ ciency in the stock market, which may worsen the investment outcome. The rm thus
needs to trade it o¤ with a lower cost of capital under delegation. We show that it is
preferable for the rm to choose delegation when the prior belief about the investment
prospect is relatively high. The rm may however choose not to delegate, when its own
signal is expected to be more precise and/or its current assets can generate a higher expected
payo¤.
The model contributes to a better understanding of the informational e¤ect of certi-
cations in the nancial market. This is of interest to practitioners and regulators as our
results provide new insights on both corporate strategies and market policies on information
disclosure. To provide clearer empirical and regulatory implications, we yet need to work on
the full characterization of the equilibrium. This is left for our future research.
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 8. The necessary condition for both (3..9) and (3..10) being
satised is 1 < 0 (i.e., I < C   S). If, however, 1 > 0 and  falls in the interval
(0; 1), it can never be the case that rm chooses C regardless of z, given that the order
ow is uninformative. Finally, if  > max f0; 1g, the inequality in (3..7) is satised but not
the inequality in (3..8), and thus the rms chooses C only when a good signal is revealed,
z = 1.
Proof of Lemma 9. By intuition, provided that the type 0 borrower is indi¤erent
from borrowing or not at the rate RIC , the type 1 borrower with a higher posterior about
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! should be attracted by the same interest rate. It can be proved easily that the following
inequality holds
1
 
V 1c   IRIC

> 1V 1s +
 
1  1V 0s : (3..22)
Proof of Lemma 10. When the interest rate RIC is higher than R, intuitively PC2
is satised at R with  being replaced by 1, and thus the type 1 borrower can be attracted
by RIC if lenders ask for RIC . The competition in the credit market will however drive down
the lending interest to R that leaves PC3 binding.
If RIC < R, R no longer satises the IC for the type 0 borrower. A pooling equilibrium
is no longer possible and the competition in the credit market will push down the interest
rate. And if RIC > Rz=1, lenders ask for RIC which satises their participation constraint
and also screens out the type 0.
If however RIC  Rz=1 < R, lenders will set the interest at Rz=1, since Rz=1 su¢ ces
to prevent the type 0 from mimicking and also satises PC1.
Proof of Lemma 11. First, we can show that I > C   S is the su¢ cient
condition for RIC < R, but not the necessary condition. Therefore, when I > C S, there
cannot exist the pooling equilibrium with the interest rate R at the nancing stage. Based
on Lemma 8 and Lemma 10, we know that for I  C   S the participation constraint
of both type 0 and 1 borrower can be satised at the interest rate Rz=0 and Rz=1. Now
if RIC > Rz=0 > R, the type 1 borrowers PC can be satised when borrowing at R. By
solving RIC   R = 0, we can obtain the threshold condition in . When 0 <  < 0, with

0
=
I V 0c +(V 0c  V 1c +V 1s )
I V 0c  V 0s +(V 0c  V 1c +V 1s +V 0s ) , there is a pooling equilibrium at the interest rate
R.
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The second threshold condition in  is obtained by solving RIC   Rz=1 = 0. If
RIC < Rz=1 < R, the type 0 will prefer not to borrower and thus it is su¢ cient for
the lenders to ask for Rz=1 to attract only the type 1.When 
00
<  < 1, with 
00
=
1
2
2(I V 0c ) (3I 2V 0c  V 1c +V 1s )
I V 0c +V 0s  (2I V 0c  V 1c +V 1s +V 0s )+
r
4V 0s (2 1)(I V 0c )+2(I2+4V 0c V 0s +(V 1c  V 1s )2 2I(V 1c +2V 0s  V 1s ))
(I+V 0s  V 0c (1 ) 2I+V 1c  (V 1s +V 0s )) , the rm
borrows at Rz=1 upon receiving the signal z = 1.
Proof of Lemma 12. Let us denote the expected trading prot, netted out the
e¤ort cost, of a speculator by 	, and the market maker price by P . Conditional on receiving
z = 1, the expected payo¤ of a speculator anticipating the rm to continue, is then denoted
by 	c;z=1,
	c;z=1 =

2  2~c;z=1

[
 
1c;z=1   1 (1  c;z=1)
  
V 1c   IRz=1   P

(3..23)
+
  
1  1c;z=1    1  1 (1  c;z=1)P ]
 

c;z=1   1
2
2
where c;z=1 is the precision choice of this speculator, while ~z=1 depends on the precision
level chosen by all the other speculators. Note that

2  2~z=1

is the probability that all
the speculators can hide the identity of their trading orders. The market maker price P
equals 1 (V 1c   IRz=1) for z = 1 and X uninformative. The above can then be simplied to
	c;z=1 = 2
1
 
1  1 2  2~c;z=1 (2c;z=1   1) (V 1c   IRz=1)   c;z=1   12
2
(3..24)
Using the rst order condition of 	c;z=1, we can obtain the optimal 

c;z=1,
c;z=1 =
1
2
+
1

21
 
1  1 2  2~c;z=1 (V 1c   IRz=1): (3..25)
Note that in the equilibrium all the speculators, being identical ex ante, choose the same
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level of e¤ort, which means ~z=1 = 

z=1. Solving the equation gives the expression of 

c;z=1
c;z=1 =
1
2
+
21
 
1  1 (V 1c   IRz=1)
 + 41
 
1  1 (V 1c   IRz=1) (3..26)
Similarly, we can obtain the expected trading prot 	s;z=0 of a speculator for z = 0
and the optimal  chosen in the equilibrium,
	s;z=0= 2
0
 
1  0 2  2~s;z=0 (2s;z=0   1)  V 1s   V 0s   s;z=0   12
2
(3..27)
s;z=0=
1
2
+
20
 
1  0 (V 1s   V 0s )
 + 40
 
1  0 (V 1s   V 0s ) (3..28)
Proof of Lemma 13. Speculators have rational expectations about both the
continuation decision of the rm and also the interest rate asked by the lenders. Let us use
	RIC to denote the expected payo¤ of a speculator,
	RIC =

2  2~RIC

(2RIC   1)
2664  (V 1c   IRIC   P ) +  (1  ) (V 1s   P )
  (1  )  (V 0s   P ) + (1  ) (1  )P
3775
 

c;RIC  
1
2
2
; (3..29)
where the market maker price P =  (V 1c   IRIC) +  (1  )V 1s + (1  ) V 0s . We can
simplify (3..29) to
	RIC = 2 (1  )

2  2~RIC

(2RIC   1)


 
V 1c   IRIC   V 0s

+  (1  )V 1s

(3..30)
 

RIC  
1
2
2
,
and then obtain the solution to the optimal e¤ort level RIC chosen by speculators in equi-
librium,
RIC =
1
2
+
2 (1  ) [ (V 1c   IRIC   V 0s ) + (1  )V 1s ]
 + 4 (1  ) [ (V 1c   IRIC   V 0s ) + (1  )V 1s ]
(3..31)
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Proof of Lemma 14. Observing the expression of  in (3..13), (3..14) and
(3..18), we know that  increases monotonically in the nominator. By computing the total
derivatives, we can decide the sign of the rst order derivative of  with respect to a certain
parameter by observing the sign of the derivative of the nominator with respect to that
parameter.
For c;z=1, we thus take the rst order derivative of 2
1
 
1  1 (V 1c   IRz=1) with
respect to , which is positive for  2

0;
(I 2V 0c +V 1c )(1 )
V 1c  V 0c  (2 1)(I V 0c )

. Similarly for RIC , we take
the rst order derivative of its nominator 2 (1  ) [ (V 1c   IRIC   V 0s ) + (1  )V 1s ] with
respect to , which is negative 8 2 (0; 1).
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is under the assumption V 1s = V
0
s = Vs. We
decompose the rst order derivative of (d   ) into part (i) and (ii) as below, in order to
understand how a change in  a¤ects separately the information production and the rms
payo¤ conditioning on the posterior and the corresponding action (C or S).
(i) The variation in information production:
2
@
 
c;z=1   RIC

@


 
V 1c   I

+ (1  ) (1  )Vs

+ 2
@
 
1
2
  RIC

@


 
V 1c   I

+ (1  )Vs

+
"
@
 
2  2c;z=1

@
 
V 1c   IRz=1
  @  2  2RIC
@
 
V 1c   IRIC
#
(ii) The variation in conditional payo¤s:
2
 
c;z=1   RIC
 @ [ (V 1c   I) + (1  ) (1  )Vs]
@
+ 2

1
2
  RIC

@ [ (V 1c   I) + (1  )Vs]
@
+
 
2  2c;z=1
 @ [ (V 1c   IRz=1)]
@
   2  2RIC @ [ (V 1c   IRIC)]@
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We can then further simplify part (i) to be
2
@c;z=1
@


 
V 1c   I

+ (1  ) (1  )Vs   
 
V 1c   IRz=1
| {z }
A (+)
+2
@RIC
@


 
V 1c   IRIC
   (1 + )  V 1c   I  (1  ) (2  )Vs| {z }
B (-)
It can be shown easily that term A is positive while term B is negative. Using the
results from Lemma 14, we can prove that, except when  is very large, an increase in 
decreases speculatorsincentives to acquire their own information when z is kept private to
the rm. The crowding-out e¤ect becomes less signicant in this case.
Now let us look at part (ii) which can be further simplied to
 
2  2c;z=1
 @ [ (I   IRz=1)  (1  ) (1  )Vs]
@| {z }
C (+)
+
 
2  2RIC
 @ [ (IRIC   I) + (1  ) (2  )Vs +  (V 1c   I)]
@| {z }
D (+)
+

 @ [ (V
1
c   I) + (1  )Vs]
@

| {z }
E (-)
It is obvious that term C is positive since Rz=1 decreases in  thanks to an increased posterior
1. Term D is also positive as RIC increases in  when the IC constraint is tightened. The
last term E is however negative. In this case, we can compute again the derivative of part (ii)
with respect to  in order to understand the speed of changing with respect to . We already
know that
@RIC
@
< 0 and
@c;z=1
@
is negative for  2

(I 2V 0c +V 1c )(1 )
V 1c  V 0c  (2 1)(I V 0c ) ; 1

, while term C,
D, and E are all constants. This means that for  su¢ ciently large, an increase of  makes
it more preferable for a rm to choose delegation in order to have the cost advantage at
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the nancing stage. Combining the analysis for both part (i) and (ii), Proposition 6 follows
immediately.
Proof of Lemma 15. By taking the rst order derivative of the nominator of c;z=1
with respect to , we can show that
@c;z=1
@
> 0 for  2

1
2
; V
1
c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c )

, and
@c;z=1
@
< 0 for
 2

V 1c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c ) ; 1

. Similarly for RIC , we take the rst order derivative of its nominator
2 (1  ) [ (V 1c   IRIC   V 0s ) + (1  )V 1s ] with respect to , which is positive 8 2
 
1
2
; 1

.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is under the additional simplications with
 = 1
2
and V 1s = V
0
s = Vs. Using the same algorithm as in the proof of Proposition 6, we can
compute the rst order derivative of the payo¤ di¤erence between two regimes with respect
to  and decompose it to two parts (i) and (ii),
(i) The variation in information production:
@c;z=1
@


 
V 1c   I

+ (1  )Vs   
 
V 1c   IRz=1
| {z }
A (+)
+
@RIC
@


 
V 1c   IRIC
  (1 + )  V 1c   I  (2  )Vs| {z }
B (-)
(ii) The variation in conditional payo¤s:
 
1  c;z=1
 @ [ (I   IRz=1)  (1  )Vs]
@| {z }
F (+)
+
 
1  RIC
 @ [ (IRIC   I) + (1  )Vs]
@| {z }
G
In part (i), we know from the previous proof that term A is positive and B is negative.
Using the result from Lemma, we observe that with  being su¢ ciently high (i.e.,  2
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
V 1c +I 2V 0c
2(V 1c  V 0c ) ; 1

), both the rst term and the second term in part (i) are negative. That is,
when a rm expects the signal z to be more precise, there would be more crowing out on
information production in the stock market.
Next, let us look at part (ii). It is obvious that term F is positive since Rz=1 decreases
in . Term G is positive for  2
n
1
2
; 1 
q
Vs
V 1c  I Vs
o
and V 1c   I 5Vs > 0, that is, when  is
relatively small and V 1c is very large. Therefore, if  is su¢ ciently large, term G is negative
and the advantage from a lower cost of capital is less signicant. Combining the analysis for
part (i), Proposition 8 follows.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let V 0s be denoted as V
1
s   . With the simplication
 = 1
2
, we can write down the expression of  in equilibrium,
s;z=0=
1
2
+
2 (1  ) 
 + 4 (1  )  (3..32)
c;z=1 =
1
2
+
2 (1  ) (V 1c   IRz=1)
 + 4 (1  ) (V 1c   IRz=1)
(3..33)
RIC =
1
2
+
[ (V 1c   IRIC   V 1s + ) + (1  )V 1s ]
2 [ +  (V 1c   IRIC   V 1s + ) + (1  )V 1s ]
(3..34)
where Rz=1 = 1I (I   (1  )V 0c ), RIC = 1I

V 1c   V 1s   1  (V 1s   )

. Note that V 1s enters
only the expression of RIC . We can thus write the rst order derivative of the payo¤
di¤erence between two regimes with respect to V 1s into two parts,
(i) The variation in information production:
@RIC
@V 1s
2664  (V 1c   IRIC) + (1  )V 1s +  (V 1s   )
  (V 1c   I + V 1s   )
3775
| {z }
H (-)
(3..35)
(ii) The variation in the conditional payo¤:
 
s;z=0   RIC
 @ [(1  )V 1s +  (V 1s   )]
@V 1s
   1  RIC @ [ (V 1c   IRIC)]@V 1s (3..36)
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In part (i), term H is negative since IRIC > I and V 1s < V
1
c   I (by assumption). We
can obtain
@RIC
@V 1s
= (1 )
2
2[(1 )+(1 )V 1s +(2 1)V 0s ]2
, which is positive. Part (ii) can be simplied
to
 
s;z=0   RIC
  
1 
 
1  RIC

, which is negative. An increase of V 1s does not a¤ect the
rms payo¤ when z = 1 in the regime of delegation and thus has a bigger impact on the
payo¤ with in-house information acquisition. The proof is thus completed.
Proof of Lemma 16. Since z is now private to the rm itself, the expected trading
prot of a speculator and thus his e¤ort level in equilibrium is no longer conditional on z,
	 R = 2 (1  )

2  2~c; R
  
2c; R   1
  
V 1c   I R
   c; R   12
2
: (3..37)
By taking the rst order derivative of 	 R with respect to , we can then obtain the optimal
e¤ort level (c; R) chosen by speculators in this case,
R =
1
2
+
2 (1  )  V 1c   I R
 + 4 (1  )  V 1c   I R : (3..38)
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CHAPTER 4.
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE IN A SPATIAL COMPETITION WITH
UNCERTAIN PRODUCT QUALITY
4.1 Introduction
There is a common view in the literature that product market competition should
have an important inuence on managerial decisions and hence the rm value.1 There
are however more debates on how exactly competition should a¤ect managerial incentives
and the underlying driving forces. Greater competition may lead to stronger incentives for
agents because principals can have an additional means to be better informed about their
agentsactions (Hart, 1983), or because greater e¤ort is required to decrease the disutility
cost to be born by an agent (Schmidt, 1997). Some other studies suggest that whether
competition may substitute for incentives rather depends on the characterization of agents
preference or the specic form of competition. For example, Scharfstein (1988) shows that
competition may lead to managerial slack when a managers marginal utility from income
is strictly positive. Graziano and Parigi (1998) show that a lower degree of product market
di¤erentiation reduces the managers optimal e¤ort choice while an increase in the number
of competing rms has an ambiguous e¤ect.
To further explore the complexity of the relationship between market competition
and managerial incentive, I build a model that considers both horizontal and vertical di¤er-
entiations between rms. Two rms are assigned to exogenous locations on a circular city.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the circle, and they need to pay a transportation
1See Nickell (1996) for a discussion.
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cost for making a purchase. The rms therefore enjoy a local market power. The trans-
portation cost is thus used as a proxy for the level of competition between two rms. At the
beginning of the game, both rms anticipate a future uncertainty in their product qualities.
They simultaneously o¤er incentive contracts to the managers in order to induce an e¤ort
level such that the expected rm prot is maximized.
I show that competition has two opposite e¤ects on the equilibrium e¤ort level. A
lower transportation cost and thus more competition impairs a rms local market power.
This reduces the marginal benet that a rm may enjoy from producing a high quality
product, particularly when its competitor also produces a high quality product. Competition
may thus a¤ect adversely incentives. On the other hand, greater competition reduces a rms
prot if it fails to produce high quality products. The e¤ect increases the optimal e¤ort level
and becomes dominant if the magnitude of quality improvement is relatively large compared
to the cost of exerting e¤ort. Both e¤ects are less signicant when rms are located further
away from each other and thus more di¤erentiated horizontally.
Moreover, I show that a large decrease in the transportation cost may change the
market structure, such that the rm with better quality goods attracts all the demand from
consumers. This makes more signicant the positive e¤ect of competition on the e¤ort
level. The results seem to suggest that the relationship between competition and incentive
depends on the absolute level of competition on top of the size of vertical di¤erentiation as
well as the cost of e¤ort. For example, Beiner, Schmid and Wanzenried (2011) nd that
more competition reduces incentives when competition levels are low. For higher levels of
competition, increased competition intensity leads to stronger incentives.
111
It may be more appropriate to relate the model in this paper to the applications of
an oligopoly industry in service sector than in manufacturing sector, as it links directly the
e¤ort choice of managers to the product quality. In addition, it is usually more di¢ cult to
evaluate and verify the quality of services, which justies the assumption that rms cannot
write a contract directly on the quality of the output. The locations of rms may also have
relevant interpretations for the service sector. For example, it is of interest to understand
how the managerial e¤ort in the nancial sector is a¤ected by the product di¤erentiation,
which includes not only the traditional interpretation as banksgeographical location choice
but also the designs of credit products, for instance.
The paper is related to the managerial incentive literature in the context of product
market competition. There are mainly three strands of theoretical research on this subject.
Early works mostly focus on the role competition in providing additional information that
can be used by the principal to infer the e¤ort level chosen by their agents. For example,
Hart (1983) formalizes the idea that competition may reduce the managerial slack when there
is a common component in production cost between managerial rms and entrepreneurial
rms. In his model, managers target at a xed prot level. Competition between the two
types of rms forces managers to exert more e¤ort for cost minimization, typically when the
common component of cost falls in the industry. Relying crucially on the characterization
of a managers preference, e.g., a discontinuity in their utility function, Harts result can
be reversed if the managers marginal utility strictly increases with income, as shown by
Scharfstein (1988). The ambiguity in the informational e¤ect on managerial incentive is also
conrmed in Hermalin (1992).
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While there is a common component in rms costs in the model of Hart (1983),
contracts are only based on an individual rms performance. Informational role of market
competition may arise also when the performance of competing managers can help a rm
infer the e¤ort choice of its own manager. A large body of literature is devoted to analyze
the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE).2 My model in this paper, while employing
one manager for each rm, does not consider this particular feature at the contracting stage.
The realization of one managers e¤ort is independent from the competing manager, although
it spills over across rms through competition in the product market. A manager is thus
rewarded more for a superior performance than its competitor.
Another strand of literature focuses on the impact of market competition on the
disutility of managerial e¤ort. Schmidt (1997) considers a risk-neutral managers incentive
in cost reduction. The author models an increase in competition as a higher probability
of bankruptcy which provides an incentive for the manager to exert e¤ort to reduce the
disutility of liquidation. Competition can also a¤ect managerial incentive inversely since it
may lower the marginal benet from reducing production cost, such that the principal no
longer nds it optimal to induce higher e¤ort. The aspect of liquidation threat on managers
action is also considered by Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999). The impact of liquidation
on managerial incentive is not modelled in my paper. I demonstrate nevertheless when the
transportation cost is su¢ ciently small and hence the competition is very intense, the rm
with better quality goods can sell to the entire market and its competitor earns zero prot.
In this case, the e¤ort level increases with competition except when the quality di¤erence is
2The early research on relative performance evaluation can be found in Holmstrom (1982), Nalebu¤ and
Stiglitz (1983), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) among others.
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signicant compared to the e¤ort cost. The positive e¤ect is more compelling than in the
scenario where rms always share the market. Such an e¤ect, although driven by a di¤erent
force, prevails in my model even when a rm is able to observe the managers e¤ort choice.
Some recent works endogenize the market structure under changes in competition in
an industry. Raith (2003) use an oligopoly framework in which rms can enter and exit a
market on a circle, depending on their protability, while agents are given incentives to reduce
production cost. Raith shows that competition always leads to greater incentives, when the
number of rms in the market becomes endogenous and depends on market fundamentals
such as product substitutability, market size or cost of entry. A related paper by Golan,
Parlour and Rajan (2010) examines how competition a¤ects the optimal e¤ort that a rm or
its shareholders wish to induce in order to increase the likelihood of producing high-quality
product. Di¤erent from Raith (2003), these authors endogenize both cost and benet from
generating a particular quality level with the market structure, and show that competition
in a market of network goods may reduce e¤ort level and hence the average product quality
in the industry.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the setup of the model. Section
4.3 provides the solution to the model and Section 4.4 discusses the link between competition
and incentives. Section 4.5 concludes. Proofs and additional discussions are relegated to the
Appendix.
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4.2 The Model
The timeline There are two rms in this model, indexed by i and i 2 f1; 2g, each producing
a single product. There are four periods, date 0, 1, 2 and 3. At date 0, rmslocations,
and hence the location of their future products, are exogenously xed in a circular city.
Meanwhile, both rms anticipate a future uncertainty in their product quality and each of
them o¤er an incentive compatible contract to its manager. Contracts are written simulta-
neously at date 0. At date 1, managers of rm 1 and 2 choose e¤ort level simultaneously,
and they work to increase the likelihood of producing high-quality goods. During the next
period (date 2), product qualities are revealed and become common knowledge. Production
is completed in both rms and rms choose their product prices at the same date. Finally,
at date 3, consumers observe rmslocations, product qualities and prices. Each of them
choose goods and make the purchase. All agents receive their payo¤s at the end of date 3.
The managers I assume that each rm hires one risk neutral manager for maximizing rms
prot. Managers have zero initial wealth but they are protected by the limited liability
constraints. It is common knowledge that both managers have the same ability in organizing
production, but the e¤ort level chosen by managers can a¤ect the probability of producing
high-quality goods.
Since there are only two possible realizations for the product quality, I assume that
the probability of producing a high-quality product, denoted by , directly matches the
e¤ort level. Using e to denote the e¤ort level,  (e) = e, e 2 [0; 1]. As e¤ort is costly, the
manager incurs a disutility  (e),  (e) = 
2
e2.  (e) is increasing and strictly convex in e,
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 0 (e) = e > 0 and  > 0. I assume that the parameter  is su¢ ciently large such that the
e¤ort level is always below 1. That is, it is never optimal to induce an e¤ort that ensures a
high product quality with certainty.
I assume that rmsprot is contractible and contracts o¤ered to managers are pub-
licly observable. In addition, ex-post renegotiations are not allowed in this model. By writing
the contract, the rm decides a transfer w to remunerate its manager. Under the assumption
that both rms and their managers are identical ex ante, managersutility functions are thus
of the same form,
w   
2
e2: (4..1)
The circular city and the product market The model setup of the circular city follows Salop
(1979). Two rms are located on the circumference of a circular city, of which the perimeter
equals 1. (See Figure 4..1.) Assuming that there is no border in this city, I assign rm
1 to a reference point x0. The relative location of rm 2 is dened by the central angle
between the radius connecting rm 1 to the center of circle and the radius connecting rm
2. This central angle is assumed to be positive when measured anti-clockwise and negative
otherwise. Everyone can travel only along the sphere. The location of rm 2 is denoted by
x when it is located with an angle  to rm 1, and the distance between two rms is

2
.
Since the semi sphere at both sides of rm 1 are symmetric, I only discuss the case when
 is positive and  2 [0; ], that is, rm 2 is assumed to be located on the left to rm 1.
For simplicity, I assume that rms produce at zero production cost. The products of rm
1 and 2 are geographically di¤erentiated, and they may also be vertically di¤erentiated by
the quality of their products, as the product quality q has two possible realizations, qh and
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ql with qh > ql.
Figure 4..1: The Circular City
Apart from two rms, there also exists a continuum of consumers of measure 1,
who are located uniformly on the circumference. Each consumer buys at most one unit of
goods that are not divisible. Consumers are identical except their locations at the circular
city, which are also dened by the central angle between the radius of rm 1 and the ones of
consumers. Let t denote the travel distance of a consumer. Assuming that the transportation
cost of a consumer is a quadratic and strictly convex function of t, a consumers utility is
then dened by,
u = qi   t2   pi; (4..2)
where pi and qi denotes respectively the price and the quality of rm is product, if this
consumer buys from rm i, i = 1; 2, and  > 0.
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Note that rm 1 is located at the reference point, and thus x1 = x0. The reservation
utility of consumers is assumed to be zero for simplicity. Based on the utility function,
consumers naturally choose the shortest arc to travel to the location of their desired product.
For the purpose of illustration, I restrict the angle between any consumer to the rms between
[ ; ]. For a consumer located with an angle  to x0, his travel distance to rm 1 is
thus
 
2
,  2 [ ; ]. His travel distance to rm 2 located at x is minn2  jj2 ;  2 o
for  2 [ ; ].
4.3 Solution to the Model
In this paper, I mainly consider the situation that the entire market is covered, i.e.,
every consumer buys one unit of product from either rm 1 or rm 2. An example for the
market being partially covered is presented in the appendix. There is a special case that
rms are both located at the reference point x0, i.e,  = 0. Either rmsproducts have the
same quality, q1 = q2, and two rms share the market but earn zero prot due to perfect
competition between them. Or q1 6= q2, the rm producing better-quality goods attracts the
entire market. I neglect the discussion of this case since the analysis is trivial in the absence
of horizontal di¤erentiation and it does not add new insights to the link between market
competition and managerial incentive problem.
Given rms are separately located, if q1 = q2, there are two marginal consumers who
are indi¤erent from purchasing from rm 1 and rm 2, one on each of the two circular arcs
between rms. If q1 6= q2, either two rms share the market, and there are two marginal
consumers, or the rm with better-quality goods attracts the entire market when the quality
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di¤erence between rms is su¢ ciently large. I rst discuss the case where both rms stay
active for any fq1; q2g, and then look at the case where the rm with lower-quality good is
driven out of the market.
Product pricing We can nd the location(s) of the marginal consumer(s) by using the utility
function dened in (4..1). For the case with q1 6= q2, let us use q1 = qh and q2 = ql as an
example for illustration. The result in demand and pricing holds for the reverse case, since
two rms are always symmetrically located on the circle, regardless of the distance between
them. I denote the locations of the marginal consumers by . The rst one can be found
at 1 on the arc between [0; ], and the following equation must be satised,
q1   

1
2
2
  p1 = q2   

   1
2
2
  p2: (4..3)
When rms share the market, there must be another marginal consumer located at 2 on
the arc between [ ; 0], for which the equation below has to be satised,
q1   
 j2j
2
2
  p1 = q2   

2      j2j
2
2
  p2: (4..4)
Solving (4..3) and (4..4), we can nd the locations of the marginal consumers, which then
give the demand for each rm. Let us denote the demand for rm 1 and rm 2 by d1 and
d2, respectively. d1 and d2 are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 17 When the market is fully covered and shared by two rms, the demands are
d1 =
1
2
+
22
 (2   ) (q1   q2   p1 + p2) (4..5)
d2 =
1
2
  2
2
 (2   ) (q1   q2   p1 + p2) (4..6)
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Remember that rms incur zero production cost. The prot of rm i, denoted by Si,
is therefore pidi, i = 1; 2. Using the demand functions in Lemma 17, each rm can then
maximize its prot pidi. It is easy to nd the reaction in product price,
R1(p2) = p1 =
 (2   )
82
+
1
2
(q1   q2 + p2) (4..7)
with q1 > 0 and q2 > 0. The reaction function of rm 2, R2(p1), is symmetric to R1(p2) in
(4..7). Solving the system of price reactions, we obtain the equilibrium price,
p1 =
1
3
(q1   q2) +  (2   )
42
; (4..8)
and p2 is symmetric to (4..8). Substituting both p1 and p2 into (4..5) and (4..6), we obtain
the demand for each rms product,
d1 =
1
2
+
22
3 (2   ) (q1   q2) ; (4..9)
and similarly d2 is symmetric to (4..9). Note that the participation constraint of the consumer
at both 1 and 

2 needs to be satised, for which the parameter region lies in q
h > ql >
(8 3)
162
 , and qh   ql < 3(2 )
42
 , such that the market is fully covered and rms share the
market even when their products are of di¤erent qualities.
If one rm gets the entire market and its competitor quits, when this rms product
has a higher quality. This occurs when the size of quality improvement is su¢ ciently large,
i.e., qh   ql > 3(2 )
42
 . Since the production cost is normalized to zero, the rm producing
lower-quality goods reduces its product price to zero under competition, and its competitor
sets the price pm at
pm = q    (2   )
42
(4..10)
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where q = qh   ql. Let S denote the prot function of the rms, and Si = pidi, i = 1; 2.
We can obtain some of the properties of Si based on (4..8) and (4..9), which are consistent
with the standard literature in industry organization.
Lemma 18 If the market is fully covered and two rms always share the market, for any
realization of product quality, their prot increases in the horizontal di¤erentiation () and
also consumerstransportation cost ().
The results in Lemma 18 are straightforward. The further away two rms are located
from each other and the more consumers need to spend on travelling, the lower competition
there is between two rms. The increased local market power pushes up the prot of the
rms.
Incentive contract Let us now look at the incentive contracts written by the rms. We check
the contracts when managerse¤ort is observable and discuss the case with unobservable
e¤ort in the extension3. Note that the transfers and thus the optimal contract are conditional
only on the realizations of product quality. Consequently, rm is objective function can be
reduced to its expected payo¤ conditional on its own product quality given all the possible
realizations of the other rms product quality. Let us use the notations Si and Si for rm
is expected payo¤ when qi equals qh and ql, respectively, i = 1; 2. Si and Si are functions
of the e¤ort level ei chosen by rm is managers,
Si = e iSi
 
qh; qh

+ (1  e i)Si
 
qh; ql

(4..11)
3The qualitative results still hold when the e¤ort is unobservable. They are however amplied when it is
more costly to induce e¤ort.
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Si = e iSi
 
ql; qh

+ (1  e i)Si
 
ql; ql

(4..12)
where the subscription  i refers to the competitor of rm i, i = 1; 2.
Firm i chooses the transfer between f w;wg,
max
f w;wg
ei
 
Si   w

+ (1  ei) (Si   w) (4..13)
s:t: w  0; w  0; and ei w + (1  ei)w   
2
e2i  0: (4..14)
With a veriable e¤ort, a manager receive w, w = 
2
e2i , which is just su¢ cient to compen-
sate the e¤ort cost. The expected payo¤ of rm i, E [Si], is thus concave in the e¤ort level
chosen by its manager. Let us use S1 (q1; q2) to denote rm 1s payo¤ for the pair of product
quality (q1; q2). Since managers are identical ex ante and they both receive a contract at
date 0, the problem is symmetric between rm 1 and rm 2.
Lemma 19 When e¤ort is observable, the rst best e¤ort choice of rm is manager is,
i = 1; 2,
eFBi =
Si
 
qh; ql
  Si  ql; ql
 + Si (qh; ql)  Si (ql; ql)  [Si (qh; qh)  Si (ql; qh)] : (4..15)
The e¤ort level eFBi increases in both Si
 
qh; ql
 Si  ql; ql and Si  qh; qh Si  ql; qh,
but decreases in the di¤erence between two terms. In the meanwhile, the scale of disutility
cost  a¤ects negatively the optimal e¤ort choice. The rst impression is that rms want to
induce managerial incentive when managerse¤ort is not too costly but brings large prot
improvement, particularly when the marginal benet from improving product quality is less
sensitive to the quality realization of the competing rm. In the next section, we look more
closely how the e¤ort choice is a¤ected by competition.
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4.4 Competition and E¤ort Choice
After computing the pricing functions of the rms and managersoptimal e¤ort choice,
I discuss next how the market competition changes the incentive of managers. I discuss
separately the scenario where both rms stay active regardless of their product quality and
the scenario where competition forces the rm with low-quality product to quit the market.
Scenario (I) Let us rst look at the scenario where two rms stay active for all realizations
of fq1; q2g, for q < 3(2 )42  . As stated in Lemma 18, a decrease in transportation cost
 lowers the local monopoly power of a rm and intensies the competition between two
rms. It brings two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, a lower  reduces a rms prot less
signicantly when it succeeds to product a high quality product while its competitor fails,
i.e., Si
 
qh; ql
   Si  ql; ql increases for a lower  . Competition has a positive impact on
incentive. On the other hand, there is also a negative e¤ect of competition. A decrease in
 impairs the marginal benet from improving quality realization when its competitor also
manages to produce high-quality goods, that is, Si
 
qh; qh
  Si  ql; qh decreases for a lower
 . Furthermore, when travelling becomes less costly to consumers, a rms prot becomes
more sensitive to its competitors e¤ectiveness in quality improvement . That is, when 
falls, the di¤erence between Si
 
qh; ql
  Si  ql; ql and Si  qh; qh  Si  ql; qh goes up. Two
e¤ects combined, the net result is dependent on the relative magnitude of q to .
In addition, when rmsproducts are more di¤erentiated horizontally, i.e.,  increases,
both the positive e¤ect and negative of  on incentives becomes less signicant. This can
be shown by the second order mixed derivatives of Si
 
qh; ql
   Si  ql; ql and Si  qh; qh  
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Si
 
ql; qh

with respect to  and .4 It is intuitive as when rmsproducts are located further
away (that is, a lower degree of production substitution), consumerss preference for the local
market becomes more important. An increase in  thus eliminates partially the impact of
increased competition caused by a lower transportation cost.
Substituting the product price and demand functions in (4..8) and (4..9) into each
prot function S in the optimal e¤ort (4..15), we can obtain the exact e¤ort level eFBi ,
eFBi =
q (22q + 3 (2   ))
42q2 + 9 (2   ) . (4..16)
Its rst order derivative with respect to  is thus,
@eFBi
@
=
62q2 (2   )
(4q2 + 9 (2   ) )2 (2q   3) (4..17)
We can observe if q is su¢ ciently large compared to the disutility cost  (q > 3
2
),
the second e¤ect dominates the rst one, and thus the optimal e¤ort level is inversely related
to competition (i.e., positively related to ). If however q < 3
2
, the quality di¤erence is
not su¢ ciently high such that it is worth less e¤ort for the rm to ensure a realization of qh.
I summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 When a market is fully covered and rms stay in competition for every
realization of fq1; q2g, the optimal e¤ort level increases in the transportation cost if the
quality improvement is signicant relative to the cost of exerting e¤ort (q > 3
2
), and
product market competition reduces incentive. The e¤ort level decreases in the transportation
cost if the quality improvement is not su¢ cient compared to the cost of e¤ort, in which case
competition enhances incentives.
4The second order mixed derivatives are, @2
Si(qh;ql) Si(ql;ql)
@@ =
42q2( )
922(2 )2 , and @
2 Si(q
h;qh) Si(ql;qh)
@@ =
  42q2( )
922(2 )2
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The results from Proposition 9 are still valid qualitatively in a world with unobservable
e¤ort and limited liability, which I discuss briey in the Appendix A.
Scenario (II) Keeping the size of quality improvement qh  ql xed, when the transportation
cost is su¢ ciently low, the rm producing lower quality goods may lose the market completely
and its competitor attracts all the consumers. This occurs when qh   ql > 3(2 )
42
 , and
the rm with better quality goods set the price as in (4..10). In this case, Si
 
ql; qh

= 0,
and Si
 
qh; ql

= q   (2 )
42
 . Si
 
qh; ql

decreases in the transportation cost  and the
horizontal di¤erentiation . This is because when  goes up, the rm with lower quality
goods gains more local market power and thus there is more price pressure to the rm with
high quality goods. This then leads to a lower incentive for the rm to induce e¤ort. The
positive e¤ect of competition on incentive is now more signicant, compared to the rst
scenario.
To show this mathematically, we can compute the optimal e¤ort induced by the
contracts and its rst order derivative with respect to  ,
eFBi =
2q   3
8
 (2   )
2 (q + )  1
2
 (2   ) (4..18)
@eFBi
@
=
2 (2   ) 
2 (22 (q + )   (2   ))2 (q   3) (4..19)
Obviously, the optimal e¤ort level increases in  if q > 3, and vice versa. Compar-
ing to (4..17) in the rst scenario, we observe that except when the quality improvement is
su¢ ciently high compared to the disutility cost (i.e., q > 3), a lower transportation cost
(and thus greater competition) leads to a higher incentive.
We thus observe that the relationship between competition and the optimal e¤ort level
125
largely depends on the size of quality improvement relative to the cost of exerting e¤ort. In
addition, when the transportation cost falls signicantly and thus the competition becomes
even more intense, market structure may change subsequently. When the loss to the rm
upon producing a low-quality product is heavier, competition triggers more incentives for
a manager to di¤erentiate vertically his product from his competitor. The positive e¤ect
becomes increasingly important.
At last, when the transportation cost becomes so high that ql < qh < (8 3)
162
 , a
special case arises that rms never compete with each other but only attract their local
market. In this case, the marginal consumer would nd it indi¤erent between making a
purchase from the closest rm and not buying. One rms product price no longer depends
on the product quality of its competitor. I give an example in the Appendix B for this
situation.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The relationship between product market competition and incentives has long been
a popular research topic, not only because of its ambiguity and complexity that provide a
fruitful area for exploration, but because of the great relevance of the subject to either rms
or regulators in the real world. This paper is another attempt to explore this research area.
I consider a spatial competition model in which rms are di¤erentiated both horizontally
and vertically, and I employ an optimal contracting framework with a multi-agent setting
to examine managerial incentives in a duopoly market. Managers are provided incentives to
improve product quality. I show that the ambiguity in the relationship between competition
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and incentives may also come from the relative degree of vertical di¤erentiation compared
to the cost of e¤ort. More specically, if the size of quality improvement is relatively large,
competition reduces incentives due to the negative impact of competition on the marginal
benet from improving the product quality. In addition, I show that the change in trans-
portation cost may alter the market structure under competition, which further inuences
the impact of competition on incentives.
There is still much to be done with this model. The future work may include two
parts. The rst part is to study the location choice before the quality realization within the
optimal contracting framework. It is also interesting to solve the location problem from the
perspective of a central planner and have a closer look at the welfare implications. This is
then related to the second part of future research, which is to establish applications in the real
economy, especially in the industry of nancial services. For example, the competition in the
credit rating market and the incentive of rating agencies, among other possible applications,
may prove to be interesting to relate to this model.
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4.6 Appendix
A. E¤ort unobservable When managerse¤ort choice cannot be observed, they choose an
optimal level of e to maximize their payo¤,
e = argmax
e2[0;1]
e w + (1  e)w   
2
e2: (4..20)
First order approach gives w   w = le. The prot maximization problem for the rms now
becomes
max
fe; w;wg
e
 
S   w+ (1  e) (S   w) (4..21)
s:t: w  0; w  0; and w   w = e: (4..22)
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Similarly, we can obtain the second-best e¤ort choice.
Lemma 20 When e¤ort is not observable, the second best e¤ort choice of rm is manager
is, i = 1; 2,
eSBi =
Si
 
qh; ql
  Si  ql; ql
2 + Si (qh; ql)  Si (ql; ql)  [Si (qh; qh)  Si (ql; qh)] : (4..23)
The second best e¤ort choice is
eSBi =
q (22q + 3 (2   ))
42q2 + 18 (2   ) ; (4..24)
of which the rst order derivative with respect to  equals
@eSBi
@
=
32q2 (2   )
(2q2 + 9 (2   ) )2 (q   3) (4..25)
In this case, the quality improvement needs to be larger than in eFBi to have a positive
relationship between optimal e¤ort level and travelling cost. The intuition is as follows.
It is more costly to induce managers incentive when their e¤ort choice is unobservable.
Consequently, it is more di¢ cult to incentivize managers to exert e¤ort due to an increase
in local monopoly power caused by a higher travelling cost.
B. A special case To show the qualitative result in the special case in which both rms
attract only the local market, I use an example with  =  (i.e., rms are located furthest
apart) for the purpose of illustration. In this case, even when a rm produces a product
with quality qh, the marginal consumer is indi¤erent from purchasing from this rm and
not purchasing any product. We then have two marginal consumers for each rm, who are
located symmetrically around the rm. The equation below holds for rm 1,
qi   


2
2
  pi = 0: (4..26)
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The problem is symmetric for rm 2. Maximizing rmsprot by the rst order condition,
we can obtain the product price
pi =
2
3
qi (4..27)
and the prot of the rm for a given qi is
Si =
4qi
3
 qi
3
 1
2
: (4..28)
Using the same formula in (4..15), we can compute the optimal e¤ort,
eFBi =
4
3
"
qh

qh
3
 1
2
  ql

ql
3
 1
2
#
: (4..29)
Given qh > ql, the optimal e¤ort always decreases in the transportation cost  , which
is not due to competition. Instead, when  increases, the decrease in a rms prot is
more signicant when the product quality is high than otherwise and thus the benet from
improving product quality shrinks. This then depresses managersincentives to exert e¤ort.
C. Proofs Proof of Lemma 17. The location of the rst marginal consumer can be
obtained directly from solving equation (4..2), and
1 =

2
+
22

(q1   q2   p1 + p2) : (4..30)
where 1 2 (0; ).
Similarly, we can obtain the location of the second marginal consumer by solving
equation (4..3),
2 =  
2   
2
  2
2
(2   )  (q1   q2   p1 + p2) : (4..31)
where 2 2 ( ; 0).
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Since the circumference of the circle and thus the total market size is 1, the demand for
rm 1s product d1 is thus
1 2
2
, and for rm 2, d2 =
2 1+2
2
. For the ease of illustration,
for the case q1 6= q2, we compute 1 and 2 for the example that rm 1 producing the high
quality products. This should not a¤ect the size of demands, since rms are symmetric in
locations. Substituting (4..30) and (4..31) into d1 and d2, we obtain (4..5) and (4..6).
Proof of Lemma 18. If two rms always share the market, rm is prot Si is
Si =
 
42(qi   q i) + 6   32
2
722 (2   )  (4..32)
Taking the rst order derivative with respect to  and  , we can obtain
@Si
@
=
(   )
362
 
9   16
4 (qi   q i)2
(2   )2 2
!
(4..33)
@Si
@
=
(2   ) 
82
  2
2 (qi   q i)2
9 (2   )  2 (4..34)
The subscription "  i" denotes the competitor of rm i. That is, if i = 1, q i is the product
quality of rm 2.
If qi = q i, it is obvious that both @Si@ and
@Si
@
are positive. If qi 6= q i, (qi   q i)2 is
equivalent to q2, q = qh   ql. Given that qh   ql > (2 )
122
for the case that rms share
the market even when one rms product has a better quality than its competitor, we can
show easily that both @Si
@
and @Si
@
are positive:
If the rmwith better quality product can seize the entire market. It is straightforward
that its price pm dened in (4..10) and thus its prot for the xed quantity of sales decreases
in both  and .
Proof of Lemma 19. For rm 1, given the realizations of the product quality
fq1; q2g and the e¤ort level chosen by the managers fe1; e2g, the expected prot of rm 1 is
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then e1 S1 + (1  e1)S1, namely,
E [S1] = e1e2S1
 
qh; qh

+ e1 (1  e2)S1
 
qh; ql

+ (4..35)
(1  e1) e2S1
 
ql; qh

+ (1  e1) (1  e2)S1
 
ql; ql
  
2
e21
With  > 0, for a given e2, E [S1] is thus a concave function of e1. Using the rst order
condition, we can obtain the best response in e¤ort level chosen by rm is manager,
e1 =
1

2664 e2S1
 
qh; qh

+ (1  e2)S1
 
qh; ql

 e2S1
 
ql; qh
  (1  e2)S1  ql; ql
3775 : (4..36)
The response function for rm 2s manager is symmetric to (4..36). Solving the system, we
can obtain the e¤ort choice stated in Lemma 19.
Proof of Proposition 9. The discussion prior to the proposition su¢ ces to prove
this proposition.
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